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Although traditional institutions remained involved in the management of local forests in some 
areas of Nepal Himalaya, Community Forestry (CF) is now a well-established formal forest 
management institution of the country. The emergence of Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in 2008 brings a new dimension to CF. Given 
that CF has been successfully implemented and adopted by many local communities, with one 
third of the nation's population being involved in various types of CF institutions, it has been 
used as an institutional platform to pilot REDD+ since 2010. Since then, the responsibility of 
CF has been extended from its initially national concerns such as meeting locals’ subsistence 
needs and promoting local biodiversity conservation, and has now moved towards more global 
concerns such as curbing climate change. Nepal’s preparation to reform its forestry governance 
warrants a study of the interactions between existing forestry institutions and emerging 
frameworks of forestry governance like REDD+, as such a study may provide valuable policy 
insights. This study therefore aims to examine the interactions of CF with both emerging 
forestry governance and traditional institutions. By specifically applying political ecology and 
discourse analysis approaches, the study analyses the effectiveness of the REDD+ pilot project 
in CF, the disjunctions and conjunctions between formal and traditional forestry institutions, 
and lastly the reasons of local variations in acceptance of CF models. Two cases of CF models 
were selected for this study - the Community Forestry User Group (CFUG) of Dolakha District 
and the Conservation Area Management Committee (CAMC) of Mustang District. 
The study found that after the implementation of the REDD+ pilot project in Dolakha, the 
CFUGs tightened the rules regarding forest use and banned livestock grazing in order to help 
sequester more carbon in the forest, both of which negatively affected the existing agroforestry-
dependent communities. Consequently, the villagers tended to have a negative perception of 
REDD+ intervention in local forests. REDD+ is not an ordinary type of management 
framework; it pays money to protect the forest and conserve the environment. The distribution 
of the REDD+ benefits was found to be a sensitive issue in the study areas where it is primarily 
determined on the basis of individuals’ caste and ethnic affiliation. Although the pilot project 
advocates forest protection, increases environmental protection awareness and supplies income 
to the CFUGs, it is concluded that ignoring the subsistence users, REDD+ cannot achieve 
sustainable environmental goals. 
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The traditional institutions of Mustang – known as the village councils – still hold the right to 
decide who should use the forest and who should not. The formal institutions, that is, CAMCs, 
select their representatives from the same villages where the village councils have executed 
traditional rules. The CAMCs’ members and supporters still need to follow the traditional 
practices and cannot simply ignore the councils’ norms. However, the village councils have 
also started to relinquish their management authority to the CAMCs. One of the study villages 
has recently started to collaborate with the CAMC. When distributing timber from the local 
forests and implementing development projects in the villages, the two institutions work 
conjointly. However, a disjunction regarding traditional and formal forest boundaries was 
found. A CAMC regulates the forests of a Village Development Committee (VDC), which 
comprises several villages. However, each village of Mustang occupies some forestland which 
the respective village councils consider to be the property of their village. The village council 
prohibits any outsiders from using the forest, even other villages of the same VDC. These 
interactions between institutions should be understood prior to implementing any new forestry 
governance. 
The study also found that the CF models (i.e., CFUGs & CAMCs) were accepted to varying 
degree by the local communities. Three potential reasons were discussed. Firstly, it was found 
that an acceptance of or resistance to a CF model cannot be determined solely by migration of 
the local forest users and their decreasing dependency on the forest. Besides reducing active 
leadership within communities, out-migration can limit local participation in the design and 
implementation of new institutions and thereby increase institutional vulnerability. Secondly, 
an institution that has wider institutional flexibility in terms of rules and rights can better 
succeed in incorporating villagers' priorities and can thus enjoy a greater level of acceptance. 
Thirdly, the persistence of traditional institutions and their ability to sanction forest uses can 
lead to the resistance of a formally designed forestry institution. It is suggested that knowledge 
of these local variations in acceptance can help to inform policy makers and facilitate future 
reforms of local forestry governance. 
Two conclusions are drawn from this study. Firstly, the success of any emerging forestry 
governance framework relies on how easily it allows communities to access and use local 
forests. Secondly, in order to achieve the desired success, the emerging forestry governance 
system has to allocate space for traditional institutions. The success or failure of a forestry 
institution can therefore be largely determined by the flexibility of its rules and whether it is 
accepted or resisted by traditional institutions. 
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1.1 Community forestry: a proxy of development and conservation 
Community Forestry (CF) is defined as forestry practices that are undertaken by local 
communities who are involved in common decision-making and the implementation of 
forestry activities (Maryudi et al., 2012; Ojha, 2014). It is conceived as the common 
property resource management of a community which takes socio-economic 
development and environmental conservation into consideration (Acharya, 2002; 
Bhattarai et al., 2002; Gautam et al., 2004; Nightingale, 2005; Baral et al., 2007; 
Charnley & Poe, 2007; Kanel & Acharya, 2008; Thoms, 2008; Ojha, Cameron, et al., 
2009). The concept of managing forests through the community has developed as an 
alternative system to government administration and market-oriented management 
(Ostrom, 1990), and was first initiated in the 1970s (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991: 4; 
Charnley & Poe, 2007). At present, approximately 1.6 billion people depend on 
community-managed forests for their livelihoods (Sikor et al., 2010), with around 10% 
of the total worldwide forests being managed by local communities (Chhatre & 
Agrawal, 2009) and about 27% of the forests in developing countries being designed for 
the community (Larson, 2011). The key aims of CF are to alleviate local poverty, 
empower forest users and improve forest conditions (Agrawal, 2007; Charnley & Poe, 
2007; Kanel & Acharya, 2008; Ojha, Cameron, et al., 2009; Maryudi et al., 2012; Bixler, 
2014; Larsen et al., 2015). If these objectives are met then the local implementation of 
CF is considered to be successful (Richard, 1995; Pagdee et al., 2006). The 
implementation of CF therefore becomes a justification for decentralization reforms 
designed to increase efficiency, equity and inclusion by means of sustainable 
management (Larson & Ribot, 2004). However, the ways in which such institutions are 
adopted, facilitated or resisted by those who are associated with them continue to raise 
many discussions concerning development and conservation, and subsequently the 
society-nature relation. 
CF can be viewed as a proxy of development and conservation, which are contentious 
notions both theoretically and politically. Theoretically, development is an ideology for 
those who claim to have the ability to change communities through both physical (e.g., 
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construction) and non-physical (e.g., education and awareness) means (Pigg, 1993; see 
also Bista, 1994). For community, the improvement of their livelihood situations is an 
index of development (Ibid). But if a forest is coercively managed primarily focusing 
on environmental conservation (see Peluso, 1993), then the CF model could be less 
effective for the improvement of forest users’ livelihoods (Blaikie, 2006; Thoms, 2008). 
For local communities, CF is a means of meeting subsistence needs, and so they may be 
less concerned with environmental conservation. 
Politically, if a forest is considered to be the property of a local community, as suggested 
by the common-pool resource theorists (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001), then variability 
in control of and access to the forest exists at various scales (Timsina & Paudel, 2003; 
Adhikari et al., 2004; Sikor, 2006; Peluso & Lund, 2011). Since communities treat 
forests as a resource to which individuals require access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003),1 forest 
users tend to vary socially and economically, with some users therefore often gaining 
privileged access to forest resources on account of their caste, ethnicity, gender and local 
power relations (Nightingale, 2005; Thoms, 2008; Sikor & Lund, 2009). Under a CF 
model, different users’ access to the forest resources can therefore vary considerably 
(Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Consequently, local-level interactions, social differences that 
are expressed through everyday interactions and access to the forests can all determine 
the success of forest ecology and the development of a community (Nightingale, 2003; 
Thoms, 2008; Nightingale, 2011; Ojha, 2014). 
As the implementation of CF mirrors development and conservation motives, different 
actors such as forest bureaucracy, national and international development agents and 
civil activists all involve in the guise of serving these motives (Ojha, Chhetri, et al., 
2008). Traditional institutions, moreover, possess an identity as non-state actors in local 
forest management (Howell, 2014; Wallbott, 2014). But when a society consisting of 
class, caste, ethnicity, and gender division operates land use practices such as CF, there 
                                              
1 According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), ‘property’ refers to possessing the rights to something, 
whereas ‘access’ denotes the ability to utilize that right. This ability is therefore not only 
determined by whether or not an individual has the rights to a property, but also the extent to 
which they have access to various means that facilitate access, such as technology, capital, 
markets, labor, knowledge, authority and access through social identity.  
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is always the possibility of contestation in terms of resource appropriation and 
accumulation. Such contestations arise not only through enforcing the knowledge that 
one social group has (see Nightingale, 2005; 2006), but also by the persistence of 
traditional forest management institutions and their ability to sanction forest use 
(Messerschmidt, 1986; Messerschmidt, 1995; Aase & Vetaas, 2007). As forest-
community relations are shaped by patterns of ownership (state owned, private property 
or collectively owned), bundles of rights (rights to access, use, manage, exclude and 
alienate) and the basis of the claims made over resources (de jure, de facto and 
customary) (Paudel et al., 2015), these contestations could not only remain apparent but 
also become magnified when customizing existing forestry institutions or implementing 
new ones. The implementation of a new framework of forestry governance,2 for instance 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), is not only 
an example of the involvement of various actors aiming to serve development and 
conservation motives, but also holds the potential to raise contestation at various scales 
(see Phelps et al., 2010; Larson, 2011; Patel et al., 2013). 
REDD+ is a climate change mitigation option designed to reduce the increasing 
concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere through minimizing 
deforestation and forest degradation.3 The emissions from anthropogenic activities, such 
as the combustion of forest biomass and the decomposition of the remaining plant 
material and soil carbon, contribute 12-20% of the total global carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions (van der Werf et al., 2009; Zarin, 2012). Under REDD+, the maintenance or 
restoration of forests is primarily taken as an effective way to sequester carbon and 
absorb it from the atmosphere, which is considered as a potential option to reduce 
climate change and find an economic incentive through the trade of carbon. Since the 
increasing temperature of the Earth is not simply a local or national problem, REDD+ 
                                              
2 I have understood ‘governance’ as “the body of rules, enforcement mechanisms and 
corresponding interactive processes that coordinate the activities of the involved persons with 
regards to a concerted outcome; governance is thus constituted and legitimised by institutions” 
(Fischer et al., 2007: 123). 
3 The full definition of REDD+ is “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (UN-REDD, 2014: 12).” 
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is conceptualized as an international climate policy framework which is supposed to 
reward developing countries and forest owners for opting to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation instead of cutting their forests down. REDD+ did 
not initially focus on poverty reduction, the enhancement of livelihoods or the associated 
socio-economic impacts to those who rely on forest resources. These ideas were added 
after recognizing the importance of forest communities in REDD+ through several pilot 
projects and a series of negotiations concerning communities’ safeguards after its 
inception in 2005 (Agrawal et al., 2011; Pistorius, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers, 
McDermott, et al., 2012; Luttrell et al., 2013; Wallbott, 2014). Since CF is an established 
governance system in terms of clearly defined boundary of forests, local autonomy in 
designing enforceable rules for the access and use of forests, and provisions for 
monitoring and sanctioning rule violations, it has been considered an institutional 
platform to pilot REDD+ (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009). However, it has since been 
realized that REDD+ cannot yield successful outcomes if it undermines traditional 
institutions and the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities (Karky & Rasul, 2011; 
Lederer, 2011; Visseren-Hamakers, Gupta, et al., 2012; Vatn & Vedeld, 2013). In this 
context, studying the local-level interaction of CF with both REDD+ and traditional 
forest management institutions is very important not only to understanding development 
and conservation motives, but also to providing knowledge to emerging forestry 
governance such as REDD+. To explore such interactions, the following main research 
question guides this study: 
How does community forestry interact with emerging forestry governance and 
traditional institutions? 
To operationalize the above question, this study, taking cases of CF from Nepal, first 
examines the interaction of CF with the REDD+ pilot project. It then explores the 
interaction of CF with traditional institutions, and finally it attempts to combine both 
types of interaction to provide knowledge to emerging framework of forestry 
governance such as REDD+. In what follows, I will contextualize the main research 
question by presenting the historical development of forest governance in Nepal, 
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explaining the changing state of Nepali forests and placing it in its local context with 
specific research questions. 
1.2 A brief history of forest management in Nepal 
In Nepal, various forest management institutions have been implemented, especially 
since the 1970s, but their principal goals, either implicitly or explicitly, have remained 
as the conservation of forests and to allow their users some degree of access to the forests 
for the purposes of their wellbeing. The forests provide firewood, fodder, leaf litter, 
timber, grazing resources, medicinal plants, saleable products, and edible fruits, and are 
integrated into agricultural practices that serve the major sources of livelihoods for 
72.6% of the total population (WorldBank, 2017). Historically, the forests were 
traditionally managed by the local inhabitants of small chiefdoms and fiefdoms, and had 
abundant coverage up until the early 19th century (Bhattarai et al., 2002; Bhattarai & 
Khanal, 2005).4 Prior to 1957, as the land was a source of wealth and power for the state 
(Stiller 1975: cited in Mahat et al., 1986), the rulers invited anyone to convert as much 
forestland as possible into agriculture land and asked them to pay tax up to half of their 
production (Mahat et al., 1986). The ruler also granted forested land as jagir5 and birta6 
to state employees and the nobles. These grantees were free of tax7 and were allowed to 
keep all of the production from their land (Mahat et al., 1986; Acharya et al., 2008). The 
rulers also appointed Jamindars (village headmen and revenue functionary). The 
Jamindar was also entitled to reclaim as much new land as they wanted without paying 
any additional tax to the state. Jagirdars (state employees) and birtawal (land grantees) 
could lease granted land to peasants. The distribution of land in the name of jagir and 
birta accelerated the pace of deforestation during this period. 
                                              
4 A brief history of community forestry in Nepal has also been presented in Paper IV. 
5 Jagir is land granted by the ruler to government officials. These people were known as 
jagirdar. Other land on which the government collected taxes was known as Jagera (Regmi 
1978: 22). 
6 Birta is land granted to individuals by the ruler for some noble cause until it was confiscated 
by the ruler (Regmi 1978: 25). 
7 The terms and conditions of birta grants varied greatly. Some grantees used to pay a nominal 
tax to the government (Regmi 1978: 25). 
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During the rule of the Rana (1846-1950), the policy of encouraging individuals to 
convert forest land to agricultural land continued (Gautam et al., 2004), and forest 
decline continued even more rapidly (Bhattarai & Khanal, 2005). Talukdar and 
jimmmawal (village headmen appointed by the Ranas in the Western and Eastern hills) 
and their chitaidar (forest watchman) were responsible for regulating forest use, 
however there were almost no restrictions on the use of forest products for subsistence 
purposes (Mahat et al., 1986; Springate-Beginski et al., 2007). Until 1950, one-third of 
the nation’s forest was under jagir and birta holders, of which about seventy-five 
percent belonged to Rana families only (Mahat et al., 1986; Malla, 2001). 
The Rana regime was overthrown in 1950, and in 1952-53 a new interim democratic 
government succeeded at drafting a forest policy. As deforestation was widespread, the 
policy recommended immediate action towards reforestation in the hills and soil 
conservation in the chure8 (Graner, 1997). However, the drafted policy was not able to 
prevent the conversion of forest land into agricultural land and the export of timber from 
the tarai (southern low-land of Nepal), thus the deforestation continued (Gautam et al., 
2004) (see Map 1 in Chapter 3 for the administrative divisions of Nepal). 
During 1957-1977, the government nationalized the forests through the Private Forest 
Nationalization Act of 1957 in an effort to halt deforestation. It diminished the power of 
the revenue functionaries, the jamindars and talukdars/jimmawal (Mahat et al., 1986), 
and immensely restricted forest use (Malla, 2001; Ojha, Timsina, Kumar, Belcher, et 
al., 2008; Paudel et al., 2009). The nationalization act was further strengthened by the 
Birta Abolition Act of 1959, the Forest Act of 1961, the Rangeland Nationalization Act 
of 1961, the Forest Protection (Special Arrangement) Act of 1967 and the National Parks 
and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1973 (Bhattarai & Khanal, 2005; Sinha, 2011). 
Although the intention of nationalization was to prevent further deforestation and to 
promote the use of privately owned forests (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; Kanel & Acharya, 
2008), farmers interpreted the situation as allowing almost free access to the local forests 
(Malla, 2001). Additionally, as the government had insufficient human and technical 
                                              
8 Chure or Churiya is the narrow hill land extending east to west between middle hill and the 
tarai (plain) land, which is also known as siwalik in India. 
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resources, it was not able to regulate the forests effectively, thus illegal use of the forests 
also increased (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; Malla, 2001; Bhattarai et al., 2002). 
Consequently, the national forests became de facto open access resources, causing 
widespread deforestation during this period (Bajracharya, 1983; Hobley, 1985; Arnold 
& Campbell, 1986; Messerschmidt, 1986). 
In the 1970s, a major concern of the government was the development of rural areas and 
the protection of the environment. This led them to follow the recommendations of the 
Forestry Conference, held in Kathmandu in 1974, to draft a National Forestry Plan 
(Gautam et al., 2004), which was passed in 1976. This plan recognized the importance 
of community participation in forest management and realized the impossibility of the 
protection and development of the forests by the government alone (Shrestha, 1996; 
Gautam et al., 2004; Bhattarai & Khanal, 2005). The Plan not only focused on forest 
conservation but was also concerned with meeting local people’s needs. This plan can 
thus be considered a major turning point in the history of the forestry institutions of 
Nepal. 
In addition, the rhetoric of degradation, which was based on the writings of Eckholm 
(1975) regarding the alleged environmental degradation of Nepal and was later labelled 
the theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation by Ives & Messerli (1989), also 
became widespread during 1970s (Kanel & Acharya, 2008). In line with the theory, the 
World Bank projected in 1978 that the forests of Nepal would be completely depleted 
within the coming 15 to 25 years (Ibid). The theory contended that the underlying reason 
for the disastrous flooding of the plains was the depletion of forests by the poor hill 
farmers of Nepal (Ives & Messerli, 1989). Ojha et al. (2009) and Springate-Beginski et 
al. (2010) argue that the emergence of a CF model in the hills of Nepal was a response 
to the theory. 
By the late 1970s, in addition to the ongoing deforestation and degradation rhetoric, the 
growing concern of local people to participate in forest management, the failure of 
centralized government management and pressure from international agencies all forced 
the government to initiate a community-level forest management program in 1978 
(Bhattarai et al., 2002; Gautam et al., 2004; Paudel et al., 2009). In 1978, the government 
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implemented Panchayat Forest Rules and Panchayat Protected Rules, and allowed users 
to form Panchayat Forests (<125 ha of degraded forests) and Panchayat Protected 
Forests (<500 ha of good forests) at Village Panchayat9 (Fox, 1993), which were the 
precursors of the current CF (Bhattarai et al., 2002). Yet the forest policies were mostly 
guided by the concept of environmental protection (Malla, 2001; Gautam et al., 2004), 
and provided limited rights to local communities to use forest resources (Collett et al., 
1998; Malla, 2001). Consequently, only a very small proportion of forest land (36,376 
hectares compared to a target of 1,835,000 hectares) was handed over to the local 
communities during 1976 to 1987 (Bhattarai & Khanal, 2005). 
Although several polices were implemented before the mid-1980s, the participation of 
local communities was not as expected. Consequently, the Nepali government, with the 
help of international donor agencies and Nepali experts, designed the 25-year Master 
Plan for the Forestry Sector during 1986-88, which was approved by the government in 
1989. This plan recognized community and private forestry, and encouraged the transfer 
of forest management rights to communities (Gautam et al., 2004). The plan also 
established the concept of Forest User Groups (FUGs) for the management of the 
forests, and recommended that all accessible forests of the hills be handed over to local 
communities. The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector of 1989 can therefore be 
considered as another major policy shift in the history of forest management. 
Even after the implementation of the Master Plan, the situation of many villagers did 
not improve. Villagers did not generally believe that the promise of decentralization of 
forest management would be effective (Malla, 2001). However, the promulgation of the 
Master Plan gained momentum after the introduction of the multi-party democracy in 
1990. The newly elected government also wanted to enhance community development 
through the decentralization of power and resource management, and as a result, the 
                                              
9 Forests managed by a Panchayat, which was the lowest administrative unit of the government 
from 1960-1990. The Panchayat system, which elected members from the three-tiered 
Panchayati institutions (Village Panchayat, District Panchayat and National Panchayat), was 
headed directly by the king. It was a party-less regime which was established by King Mahendra 
Bir Bikram Shah Dev in 1960, and was demolished by the People’s Movement in 1990, during 
the reign of King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev. This period is also known as the Panchayat 
regime in Nepal. 
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Forest Act of 1993 and the Forest Regulation of 1995 were introduced, which contain 
the most decentralized policies of the government to date. Meanwhile, the National 
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act had also been revised in 1993, and initiated the 
concept of community participation in the management of protected and conserved 
forests. 
The Forest Act of 1993 provided the basis for implementing the Forest Regulation of 
1995, which regulates (1) government-managed forest, (2) protected forest, (3) 
community forest, (4) leasehold forest, (5) religious forest and (6) private forest. 
The government-managed forest offers limited user rights to the local people, and is 
regulated by a state agency (the District Forest Office). Locals are allowed to collect 
grass, dead branches and certain fruits (Acharya et al., 2008). 
‘Protected forests’ are being managed with a conservationist objective, and, according 
to the government, are protected for scientific and environmental reasons (MoFSC, 
2013). The local community has limited access to the protected forests. The government 
states that they are primarily designed to enhance the mobility of wildlife and to 
conserve biodiversity by linking the existing protected and conserved areas (Shrestha et 
al., 2014).  
Community forest is the most successful local-level forest management program of 
Nepal, and provides more rights than any other forestry programs to local communities 
to access, use, manage and sell forest products (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Ojha, 
Timsina, Kumar, Belcher, et al., 2008; Thoms, 2008). It is implemented by forming a 
Community Forestry User Group (CFUG).  
The leasehold forest is handed over to a community for an initial period of up to forty 
years with the possibility of renewal for another forty years, and is designed to promote 
local industries and encourage production and sale through forestation. Under the 
special arrangements of the Forest Regulation, poor and marginalized communities can 
also apply to the District Forest Office (DFO) for a leasehold forest. 
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Religious communities or institutions can conserve national forest that is near any 
religious site by claiming it as a religious forest. The procedures for claiming religious 
forests are similar to those for community forests (Bhattarai & Khanal, 2005). 
Private forest that has been planted and conserved in privately owned land by an 
individual or organization can also be officially registered at the DFO as a private forest. 
The owner has the right to decide how to conserve, develop, manage and use the forest, 
and can also determine the price of its timber for commercial purposes (MoFSC, 2013). 
In the case of timber logging, the owner has to inform the DFO, and also pay the 
necessary tax to the government. 
The National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1973 manages ‘protected areas’, 
which are particularly aimed to conserve and protect the wildlife and biodiversity of the 
country. Protected areas are further categorized as (1) national parks, (2) wildlife 
reserves, (3) hunting reserves, (4) conservation areas and (5) buffer zones. There are 
currently 10 national parks, 6 conservation areas, 3 wildlife reserves and 1 hunting 
reserve under the protected areas category (www.dnpwc.gov.np) (see map in appendix 
1). This Act was amended for the fourth time in 1993, when the option was created for 
community participation through the Conservation Area Management Regulation of 
1996 and Buffer Zone Management Regulation of 1996 (Heinen & Mehta, 1999; 
Bajracharya et al., 2008; Paudel et al., 2008). These regulations introduce community-
level forestry institutions, namely the Conservation Area Management Committee 
(CAMC) and Buffer-Zone Management Committee (BZMC), in order to regulate the 
forests that are under the boundary and buffer of protected areas. 
This study concentrates on community forestry that is regulated by the Forest Regulation 
of 1995 and the Conservation Area Management Regulation of 1996. The details of 
these regulations and their community-level practices are presented in Paper IV. 
In 2008, Nepal first showed its interest in REDD+ (MoFSC, 2008), and embarked into 
‘REDD+ readiness’ in 2010 (MoFSC, 2010). 10 Subsequently, Nepal has formed a three-
                                              
10 REDD+ is supposed to pass through three phases. In the first phase, a country prepares for 
REDD+ by designing the necessary strategies, such as changing existing legislation, 
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tiered REDD+ institution, consisting of (1) the Apex Body, (2) the REDD Working 
Group and (3) the REDD Implementation Center.11 The national objective of REDD+ 
for Nepal is “to strengthen the integrity and resilience of forest ecosystems, and improve 
socio-economic and environmental values of forests for emission reductions and 
increased community benefits through improved policy and legal measures, improved 
institutional functioning, and with enhanced stakeholders' capacity, capability and 
inclusiveness” (MoFSC-RIC, 2015: 4).  
Following the embarkation into REDD+, six pilot projects have been implemented by 
national and international organizations in order to support the national REDD+ 
objective (MoFSC, 2011; Newton et al., 2015). These pilot projects have been 
implemented in selected districts representing all the geographic regions of Nepal (Ibid). 
As CF has been successfully implemented and adopted by local communities, it has 
been used as an institutional platform to pilot REDD+. Since the emergence of REDD+, 
the responsibility of CF has shifted from purely national concerns such as meeting local 
people’s subsistence needs and local biodiversity conservation, and moved towards 
more global concerns such as curbing the increasing levels of climate change. 
1.3 The changing state of Nepali forests and carbon storage 
Alongside Nepal’s history of forest management and policy development, national 
forest coverage has also changed. At the time of the realization of community 
participation in forest management in 1978, 42.7% of the total land of Nepal was 
covered by forest. By 1986, this figure had decreased slightly to 42.2%, and then 
decreased even further to 39.6% in 1994 (MoFSC-FAO, 2009). Today, 44.74% of the 
                                              
establishing a ‘reference level’ (a baseline for changes in carbon stocks, which is used as a 
benchmark for measuring the impact of REDD+ policies and actions and to define emission 
reductions (Angelsen et al., 2012: 381 [emphasis in original])), developing a mechanism for 
monitoring, reporting and verification of the stored carbon, and capacity building activities. 
Although Nepal has not fixed its national Reference Level yet, its historical reference period is 
2000-2010, and gross emissions and gross removals during the period are 293,231,645 tCO2 
and 85,964,612 tCO2 respectively (camco-MoFSC, 2015: 24). In the second phase, in addition 
to capacity building activities, a country starts demonstrating REDD+ activities by piloting 
REDD+ projects. In the third phase, a country will start to receive incentives for the 
demonstrated emissions reduction; however, the reduced emissions must be measured, 
reported, and verified continuously.  
11 The details of these institutions have been presented in Papers II & III 
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country’s total land is covered by forest (DFRS, 2015).12 The following table shows the 
changes to forest cover between 1978 - 2015. 
Table 1: Forest cover status of Nepal (1978-2015) 
Cover type Unit 
Years 
1978* 1986* 1994* 2015** 
Forest 
Area (000 ha) 5,616.8 5,504.0 4,268.0 5,962.0 
Percentage 38.0 37.4 29.0 40.4 
Shrub 
Area (000 ha) 689.9 706.0 1,560.0 647.9*** 
Percentage 4.7 4.8 10.6 4.4 
Total 
Area (000 ha) 6,303.7 6,210.0 5,828.0 6,609.9 
Percentage 42.7 42.2 39.6 44.7 
Source: * adopted from “Nepal Forestry Outlook Study” (MoFSC-FAO, 2009: 17) 
and ** “State of Nepal’s Forests” (DFRS, 2015: 25). *** This also includes areas 
with trees having 5-10% crown cover (531,066 ha or 3.59%): shrub land occupies 
116,826 ha or 0.79% of the total land. 
During 1978/79 – 1994, the forest area decreased at a rate of 1.7% per year, whereas 
forest and shrub coverage together decreased at an annual rate of 0.5% (Ibid). The 
decrease was 0.06% annually during 1990/91 – 2000/01 (MoFSC-FAO, 2009: 17). High 
population growth, unregulated settlement, unemployment, encroachment, grazing and 
forest fires were all reported as some of the causes of this forest depletion (Ibid). 
However, the rate of deforestation slowed during the period 2000-2010 when compared 
with the period 1995-2000 (FAO, 2010: 230).  
Of the country’s total forest, 82.68% (4.93 million ha) lies outside the protected areas 
and is regulated by the Forest Act of 1993. The remaining 17.32% (1.03 million ha) lies 
inside protected areas and is regulated by the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
Act of 1973. Within the protected areas, core areas contain 0.79 million ha of forest, 
with the buffer zones containing 0.24 million ha (DFRS, 2015: 29). Approximately 30% 
                                              
12 The forest coverage is further divided into two categories as (1) forest, which has more than 
10% tree crown cover, occupies 5.96 million ha or 40.36% of the total, and (2) Other Wooded 
Land (OWL), which includes tree that has 5-10% crown cover and shrub land, occupies 0.65 
million ha or 4.38% of the total forest coverage (DFRS, 2015). 
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of the country’s total forest is managed by more than 25,000 community-based forest 
management institutions (MoPE, 2016).13 
According to recent estimates, Nepal, which contributes 0.027% of the world’s total 
carbon emissions (MoPE, 2016), preserves a total of 1,157.37 million tonnes of carbon 
(DFRS, 2015: 41). This figure comprises 1,054.97 million tonnes (176.95 t/ha) from 
forests, 60.92 million tonnes (105.24 t/ha) from 'other wooded land’ (trees with 5-10% 
crown cover and shrub land) and 41.48 million tonnes (7.84 t/ha) from ‘other land’. 
Furthermore, of the total carbon stock in the forest, tree components (live, dead standing, 
dead wood and belowground biomass) constitutes 61.53%; forest soils constitute 37.8%; 
and debris constitutes 0.67% (Ibid). 
By implementing REDD+, Nepal aims to reduce about 14 million tons CO2 emissions 
by 2020, enhance forest carbon stock by at least 5% by 2025 as compared to 2015 level, 
and put in place forest carbon trade and payment mechanism by 2025 (MoPE, 2016). 
Preliminary estimates of the UN-REDD Program (2014: 5) show that REDD+ may bring 
between $20 million and $86 million per year to Nepal. 
1.4 Placing main research question in local context 
The changes in the forestry institutions, policies and forest coverage, as presented in the 
above subsections, have not happened in isolation, but must be seen in connection with 
the wider political and ecological context of Nepal. Despite analyzing deforestation as 
a historical phenomenon which was mainly caused by the government’s land 
reclamation policy (Bajracharya, 1983), Nepalese farmers and forest users were blamed 
as the degraders during the 1970s (Eckholm, 1975). The degradation rhetoric created 
the basis to initiate conservation-oriented and aid-based intervention (Thompson & 
Warburton, 1985; Guthman, 1997). Subsequently, recognizing the forest as one of the 
main sources of basic needs14 (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; Graner, 1997), the antecedent 
                                              
13 The lands covered by community-based forestry institutions range from 1 to 4,000 hectares 
(DoF 2009: cited in Ojha, Persha, et al., 2009, p.: 4). 
14 Although food, clothes, housing, education, and health were identified as the basic needs 
under the Basic Needs Fulfillment Programme of 1985 by the government, the need for 
firewood was also later recognized as a securement of the basic needs (Graner, 1997: 3). 
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of current CF was initiated in 1978 considering the farmers as the original managers of 
the forest and protectors of biodiveristy (Hobley, 1985; Arnold & Campbell, 1986; Ives, 
1989; Bhattarai et al., 2002). CF flourished during the 1990s and the 2000s, and the 
same communities who had previously been blamed for the degradation were now 
considered as the masters to reverse the deforestation process, establish local-level 
institutions and support economic development in rural areas (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; 
Rusten & Gold, 1995; Jackson et al., 1998; Acharya, 2002; Gautam et al., 2002; 
Manandhar-Gurung, 2007; Ojha, Persha, et al., 2009). During the 2010s, CF institutions 
have been considered for generating possibilities for both commercial and subsistence 
purposes (MoFSC, 2010; Paudel, 2016b). The implementation of the REDD+ pilot 
project in various parts of the country (see MoFSC, 2011; Newton et al., 2015), taken 
as a potential mechanism to alleviate poverty and conserve biodiversity (MoFSC, 2010; 
Shrestha et al., 2014; MoPE, 2016), is an output of such consideration. 
History shows that the CF of Nepal was sparked by a sense of crisis, that is, deforestation 
and degradation. REDD+ is a continuation of this conception, and has also been initiated 
to conserve forests and develop villages through supporting the livelihood earnings of 
forest users (see Thompson et al., 2011). As REDD+ has been piloted in the country, 
the extent to which its implementation affects local communities’ ability to access 
forests and the ways in which communities perceive the insertion of such new 
management frameworks in their local forests are both important issues, not only as a 
means of understanding development and conservation motives but also to analyze 
REDD+’s future potential as a system of forestry governance. Studies show that 
different discourses emerged after its piloting (see Vijge et al., 2016; Blais-McPherson 
& Rudiak-Gould, 2017). Communities are reported to be skeptical about access to 
forests, and uncertain about their share of the carbon benefits (Neupane & Shrestha, 
2012; Maraseni et al., 2014; Poudel et al., 2014), REDD+ increases external dominance, 
including donors and international organizations, in local forest management (Ojha et 
al., 2013), and REDD+ may create conflict at a local level (Patel et al., 2013; Saito-
Jensen et al., 2014). However, there is a lack of studies that are methodologically 
investigating such discourses within the Nepali context. Previous studies also show that 
the forests and forestry institutions have mainly benefitted the elites and those who hold 
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more land and livestock (Bhattarai et al., 2002; Adhikari et al., 2004; see also Larson & 
Ribot, 2007), which therefore severely challenges the development potential of local 
communities (Thoms, 2008). The implementation of REDD+ may also be an 
opportunity for providing additional earning potential to those community members 
who would have more ability to access to forest resources and benefits. If this situation 
persists, it also challenges meeting the very goal of REDD+. The analysis of discourses 
concerning the implementation of REDD+ and its interaction with CF users can 
therefore not only provide insights into ways of rectifying its flaws for future 
implementation, but also provide insights to policy makers. 
Although the traditional institutions of Nepal’s hills were formalized as CF after the 
1970s (Rusten & Gold, 1995; Malla, 2001; Gautam et al., 2004; Nightingale, 2006), the 
traditional institutions of the Himalaya region still hold some rights to regulate local 
natural resources such as the forests, water and pastureland (Aase & Vetaas, 2007; 
NTNC, 2008; Paudel, 2011; ACAP, n.d.). The persistence of traditional institutions is 
influential in the decision-making processes regarding local use of natural resources 
(Messerschmidt, 1986; Aase & Vetaas, 2007; Spiteri & Nepal, 2008). Consequently, 
while regulating local forests, there are disjunctions and conjunctions between 
traditional and formal forestry institutions. Being an emerging framework of forestry 
governance, REDD+ should not dispel the existing institutional plurality and their 
apparent influence on forest management (Sikor et al., 2010; Howell, 2014; Wallbott, 
2014). Neglecting such plurality, when devising regulations in the context of REDD+, 
may augment conflicts at a local level. In Nepal, however, there is a lack of studies to 
investigating the diverse relations between formal and traditional forestry institutions, 
and extrapolating those relations as useful knowledge to emerging forestry governance. 
The ways in which an emerging framework assumes accountability for incorporating 
traditional practices and solving potential conflicts also determine the success or failure 
of a CF (Lederer, 2011; Vatn & Vedeld, 2013). 
Moreover, Nepal’s forests are also being managed by different types of CF models and 
their actors, such as the members of local CF user groups, traditional institutions, 
conservation projects and development agents (see also Ojha, Timsina, Kumar, Banjade, 
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et al., 2008). Some models offer communities flexible rules to use and manage local 
forests, while others restrict them to some extent (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Ojha, 
Timsina, Kumar, Belcher, et al., 2008; Ojha, 2014). Due to such variations in 
management, the factors behind their success also vary (Paudel et al., 2006; Thoms, 
2008; Ojha, 2014). Additionally, due to traditional institutions’ ability to sanction local 
forest use, some communities also resist CF models that are implemented. 
Consequently, some communities accept CF models while others resist them (see also 
Lawrence, 2007; Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015). However, the extent to which these 
variations in local acceptance of CF models can provide knowledge to emerging forestry 
governance has also been a largely neglected issue in Nepal. Identifying the reasons 
behind such local variations and their different actors and factors can make policy-
makers more aware of these issues in advance, which may in turn be instrumental to 
increasing the potentiality of local acceptance of emerging forestry goveranance in the 
future. 
To fill the above research gaps, this study operationalizes the main research question by 
framing the following specific research questions:  
i. How effective is the change of forest management from community forestry to 
new management frameworks such as REDD+ in terms of forest use? 
ii. How can ongoing debates about REDD+ in Nepal be analyzed by using the 
method of discourse analysis? 
iii.  How can an understanding of the disjunctions and conjunctions between 
traditional and formal institutions be a source of knowledge to facilitate future 
change in forest management?  
iv. Why are there local variations in the acceptance of formal forest management 
models? 
Taking a political ecology approach to analysis of two CF institutions of Nepal (the 
Community Forestry User Group of Dolakha District and the Conservation Area 
Management Committee of Mustang Distirct), the above four questions are addressed 
respectively in four papers. The papers are attached at the end of this thesis. A brief 
summary of them is presented below. 
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1.5 Summary of papers  
The first research question is addressed in Paper I. This paper, taking a case from 
Dolakha district of Central Nepal, focuses on the effectiveness of the REDD+ pilot 
project’s implementation in the local community managed-forests, and analyses 
villagers’ experiences after the implementation. The study found that most villagers 
lacked knowledge about REDD+ and the associated benefits from the pilot project. Few 
villagers were therefore found to be motivated to participate in the pilot project. In order 
to facilitate the pilot project, the local CFUGs banned grazing and tightened user rules, 
which limited the locals’ ability to collect and make use of forest products. Furthermore, 
REDD+ benefits were distributed to some poor households but not to all of them, which 
resulted in an antagonistic sentiment in the villages. This study suggests that a rigorous 
assessment of REDD+, combined with the involvement of local community without 
compromising the uses of forest products, is of the utmost importance before 
considering REDD+ as an alternative to the CFUG model in Nepal. 
The second research question, which is theoretical by nature and addressed in Paper II, 
is presented in detail in the next chapter, which also explains the theoretical orientation 
of this study. In brief, a discourse, which is an articulation of an individual or an 
organization, can be analyzed by using a poststructuralist perspective as presented by 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), or a structuralist perspective as presented by Fairclough 
(1995). The study ultimately suggests combining both perspectives to scrutinize 
REDD+ in the Nepali context, where people tend to consider the forests as a vital source 
of earning livelihoods and the foundation of sustaining the local environment.  
The third research question is addressed in Paper III. Examining the case of Mustang 
district of Western Trans-Himalayan Nepal, this paper analyzes the disjunctions and 
conjunctions between the formal and traditional institutions that simultaneously exist to 
regulate the forest, and discusses how disjunctions can be reduced to fit the present 
context of forest management. The study found that the local forests which should by 
regulation be managed by Conservation Area Management Committees (CAMCs), 
which are locally formed community-based forest management institutions, are 
simultaneously managed by the local traditional institutions known as Village Councils. 
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However, CAMCs were also found to be gaining prominence, as one of the studied 
villages was collaborating with one. Villagers appreciate the development initiatives 
undertaken by the CAMCs, but three disjunctions regarding forest management were 
identified. Firstly, there was a disjunction between two sets of rules for forest resource 
utilization. Secondly, there were role dilemmas between the members of village councils 
and CAMCs in regulating the forests because the representatives of the CAMCs, who 
also live in the villages where the village councils exist, are required to follow the 
traditional rules. Thirdly, there were territorial disjunctions because the formal 
administrative forest borders do not coincide with the customary ones. The simultaneous 
existence of two institutions thus blurs the actual rights over forest resources. The study 
suggests that knowledge of parallel institutions is vital to acclimatise forest management 
to new circumstances, such as the implementation of REDD+. 
The fourth research question is addressed in Paper IV. This paper explores the reasons 
for the variations in local acceptance of implemented CF models, that is, CFUGs in 
Dolakha and CAMCs in Mustang. It does so by proposing three hypotheses. Firstly, that 
the variation in local acceptance is due to increasing out-migration and decreasing use 
of community-managed forests for livelihoods. Secondly, that acceptance is due to the 
management arrangements of the CF models themselves. Finally, that the resistance to 
CF models can be explained by the persistence of traditional practices of forest use. The 
study found that acceptance of or resistance to a CF model cannot be explained solely 
by the migration of forest users and their decreasing dependency on the forests. Rather, 
out-migration prevents the participation to implement new institutions, and increases 
institutional vulnerability by reducing active leadership. A CF model that has wider 
institutional flexibility can succeed in incorporating villagers’ priorities and can thus 
enjoy enhanced acceptance. And the persistence of traditional institutions’ ability to 
impose sanctions on forest uses can resist a formally designed CF model. The study 
concludes that institutional flexibility and the persistence of traditional institutions are 
the main reasons behind the variation in local acceptance of CF models. Finally, as the 
government of Nepal is revising forestry legislation, it is recommended that knowledge 
of these variations in local acceptance can help policy-makers to better prepare for 
REDD+ or any other future management model. 
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1.6 Organization of the study 
The diverse control of, and access to, forest resources by differently positioned members 
of a community may be better represented through cohering different realities that are 
analyzed in the previously described papers. Philosophically, the extent to which 
observed realities are real has been debated for several years (Burawoy, 1991b). In 
chapter two, I shall elaborate on the theoretical orientation of this study. The chapter 
presents political ecology as the theoretical basis of this study, and discourse theory as 
an analytical tool of political ecology. The chapter also presents Paper II and reiterates 
some of the concepts presented in the paper. Chapter three justifies the selection of cases 
for this study, introduces the study areas, and documents the methodology and methods 
that have been applied to collect and analyse data. The fourth chapter discusses the 
study’s findings, assesses the potential contribution of these findings to Common-Pool 
Resource (CPR) theory, and draws conclusions. Finally, the four aforementioned papers 
are attached in the subsequent section, with each paper sequentially addressing the 







2. Conceptual and theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction: understanding an institution 
Forests affect people and their habitat (e.g., ecosystem services), and, simultaneously, 
people affect forests (e.g., livelihoods use, policy development and management 
practices). The management of forest is guided by the institutions of a society. These 
institutions can be formal and/or traditional (see Agrawal, 1995). An institution can be 
best understood if we look at how it forms or originates in a society. Berger & Luckmann 
(1966: 70-71) define institutions as regular human actions such as sharing greetings, 
which are subject to habitualization in society and are understood by those who share 
the same actions. For them, any activity or action of individuals that is repeated 
frequently orients to form a social pattern and, therefore, is subject to habitualization. 
Over the course of time, individuals develop shared concepts, actions and mental maps 
in the form of language, which establish shared meanings of their actions and 
cooperation among individuals. Such shared meanings generalize actions and habits and 
become sources of knowledge for other individuals, and are thus institutionalized in 
society. 
Giddens (1984: 17) considers institutions as the embedded practices which persist in 
society, such as marriage. According to him, institutions enable human actions through 
regular practices. During the course of exchanging behavioral practices in society, they 
create social relations and routines, which establish social systems. Enduring social 
systems are institutions (Ibid). 
In more practical sense, Ostrom (1986) considers ‘rule’ as a concept to refer to an 
institution. She conceptualizes the prescriptive nature of rules to understand an 
institution. A prescription refers to commonly known and used actions by individuals, 
such as required, prohibited, or permitted. These rules are the result of repetitive actions 
and implicit or explicit efforts of practitioners in defined situations. According to her 
“institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, 
sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales” (2005: 3). 
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Her definition indicates diversity and various understanding of institutions in various 
social contexts. This also indicates an elongated use of the term ‘institution’ in the 
literature. The reason behind diverse understandings of institution, she says, is due to 
‘structured situations’ of human relations. Structured situations denote market, 
elections, regular activities, hierarchies, sports, various social contexts, etc. These 
situations are guided by regularized behaviour of interaction, which are constructed by 
institutions. 
Differently from the above definitions, North (1990: 1) defines institutions as “the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction”. He considers established social institutions as constraints for 
the material and social benefits of individuals. However, he agrees that social 
institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure for everyday life, such as how 
to perform certain actions and tasks in society. But institutions also prohibit or permit 
human actions, thus, limiting their choices. According to him, the purpose of rules of 
institutions is to define the way the game is played. Then, this also denotes how to win 
the game. So, some people use their skills, strategies and techniques ‘to win the game’ 
or to gain benefits from the established institutions. To mold these tasks people establish 
organizations, such as political body, economic body, social body and educational body. 
In a practical setting, institutions determine the opportunities available within society, 
and communities’ practices (the action of individuals and organizations) to take 
advantage of those opportunities (Ibid: 7). 
In the context of natural resource management, however, institutions rather mediate 
social and environmental relations to get access to resources. Young (2010) thinks that 
unlike social institutions, natural resource institutions should have the ability to manage 
socio-environmental concerns. Managing natural resources such as forests not only 
regularizes human habits or behavior, but also mediates the people-environment 
relationship (Leach et al., 1999) because they are embedded in a complex socio-
ecological system (Ostrom, 2009). An individual’s social position and identity are the 
instruments of investment in order to gain access to natural resources (Berry, 1989; 
Nightingale, 2011). This is why politically-oriented leaders, elites (Malla, 2001; Lama 
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& Buchy, 2002; Timsina & Paudel, 2003) and gender (Nightingale, 2002; Giri & 
Darnhofer, 2010) are all particularly significant in determining access to forest resources 
and their institutions. 
At present, an institution designed for the management of natural resources, such as 
community forestry (CF), is beyond the conventional understanding of a small spatial 
unit, a homogeneous social structure, and as a shared norm (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; 
Blaikie, 2006). Rather, these institutions should be viewed as the involvement of 
differentiated actors with contested interests. The relationship between people and forest 
is power-laden (Green, 2016) because strategic actors can bypass the constraints of an 
existing institution and create new institutions that match their interests (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999) and networks of powerful and well connected actors are able to control 
the flow of knowledge and information (Yates, 2012).  
In Nepal, the material access to forest and acquisition of benefits are socially varied and 
locally contested (Malla, 2001; Bhattarai et al., 2002; Lama & Buchy, 2002; 
Nightingale, 2002; Timsina & Paudel, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2004; Nightingale, 2005; 
Poudel et al., 2014). Although local community is the sole actor to govern CF, multiple 
actors such as development and conservation agents, traditional institutions are 
embedded within it (see Ojha, Chhetri, et al., 2008), which are also visible in the forest 
management of Dolakha and Mustang (Papers I, III & IV). Both districts represent 
different discourses concerning the forest management and resource extraction. 
Additionally, traditional social structures that are institutionalized through caste and 
ethnicity and their consequences on local forest management cannot be ignored. 
Knowing the exiting social structure, action of actors and “agency” – ability of actors 
(Campbell, 2009), are important to examine the interactions of community forestry with 
emerging forestry governance and traditional institutions. Political Ecology, which 
conceives social relations and human engagement with nature as dialectically related 
(Watts & Peet, 2004: 3; Neumann, 2005: 9; Walker, 2005), facilitates an understanding 
of such embedded social practices of local forest managements.  
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2.2 The political ecology of community forestry 
The term ‘community’ means a group of interrelated people and ‘forestry’ refers to an 
entity of natural resources that is managed and used by the same group of people guided 
by an institution. The goal of a CF model, therefore, is not only to conserve the forest 
but also to utilize it. 
Although forest users are equally entitled by rules (see Leach et al., 1999), the utilization 
of resources varies between them based on factors such as the farm size, possession of 
domestic animals, the number of family members, social and political networks and their 
position in society (see also Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Ontologically, the rendering of CF 
is therefore power-laden. Political ecology, first, seeks to understand the complex 
relationship between society and nature through careful analysis of social forms of 
access to and control over resources, which, second, display them through politics of 
scale (Watts & Peet, 2004: 3). It is complex because it explains non-linear relations 
between socio-political processes and environmental issues (Walker, 2005; Robbins, 
2012). A political ecological lens is therefore useful not only to see its dynamic nature 
and implementation on a local level but also to examine the complementarity and 
contestation between governing institutions and their subjects, that is, users. 
In the management of natural resources, execution of power through social relations is 
instrumental (Yates, 2012; Tschakert et al., 2016; Nightingale, 2017), which can become 
apparent by analyzing local practice of politics (Paulson et al., 2003). Political ecology 
thus critically assesses the subjectivity – how actors (individual, group or organization) 
are brought into a position to stake claims, to have a voice, and to be recognizable by 
authorities (Krause & Schramm, 2011) - while accessing, accumulating and 
materializing natural resources.15 Considering political ecology in the guise of political 
economy, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 17), the pioneers, say; 
                                              
15 A subjectivity can be represented through the concept of power. Power, in the sense of 
Foucault, is both productive and repressive, both an enabling and constraining factor that exists 
only in its exercise, and is thus key to understanding subjectivity (Allen, 2002; Collier, 2009). 
Power is grounded in varying degrees in diverse dimensions of social class – such as caste, 
economic assets, social status, gender and also ethnicity (Ojha, Chhetri, et al., 2008). 
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The phrase ‘political ecology’ combines the concerns of ecology and a 
broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the 
constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, 
and also within classes and groups within society itself. 
Thus, 
[T]he human transformation of natural ecosystems cannot be 
understood without consideration of political and economic structures 
and institutions within which the transformations are embedded 
(Neumann, 2005: 9). 
Political ecology is an eclectic and inclusive approach that has been retrospectively 
created from the work of different disciplines, cultural settings and epistemological 
foundations (Blaikie, 2008). The couplet - political and ecology - was commenced 
during the 1970s. Nepal nurtured political ecology by hosting the pioneer researchers 
like Blaikie and Brookfield who not only investigated political ecology but also applied 
it while linking soil erosion and land degradation with society (see Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie 
& Brookfield, 1987). Later, several geographers, anthropologists and ecologists 
nurtured and consolidated theoretical foundations of political ecology. Some put 
emphasis on ‘political’ aspects of political ecology (Paulson et al., 2003), whereas others 
argue that the ‘ecology’ part is largely ignored in analyses (Vayda & Walters, 1999). 
Nonetheless, political ecology has increasingly been acknowledged for its potential for 
contextual analysis of environmental issues (Graner, 1997: 34). 
Political Ecology questions both the simplified and misleading descriptions and causes 
of human-environment relations, such as overpopulation, environmental degradation 
and underdevelopment (Walker, 2006; Benjaminsen et al., 2010; Robbins, 2012). 
Blaikie (1985: 4 [emphasis in original]) uses the term ‘colonial’ or classical model to 
describe the oversimplified representation of the causes of environmental degradation 
as a policy prescription. It is colonial because rulers cannot see degradation as a complex 
socio-environmental problem. They blame the land users themselves as a cause of 
degradation, subjecting them as lazy, ignorant, backward or irrational, which later link 
the problems with overpopulation and prescribe an involvement of cultivators and 
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pastoralists in the market economy as a policy solution (Ibid). The political ecological 
approach is a tradition that dismantles such oversimplified descriptions by creating as 
well as nurturing the space for other possibilities (Robbins, 2012: 98). 
The politicizing of Nepalese forest management accelerated after the emergence of 
Erick Eckholm’s (1975) rhetorical writings regarding alleged environmental 
degradation in Nepal. Despite Nepali farmers’ being aware of local physical and 
environmental fragility for a long time, Eckholm blamed them for the degradation (Ives, 
1989; Manandhar-Gurung, 2007). The rhetoric, consequently, established an imaginary 
environmental crisis narrative, according to which “environmental degradation is seen 
as a result of underdevelopment (of poverty, inequality and exploitation), a symptom of 
underdevelopment and a cause of underdevelopment (contributing to a failure to 
produce, invest and improve productivity)” (Blaikie, 1985: 9 [emphasis in original]). It 
became a hegemonic16 discourse and justified many aid-based interventions in Nepal 
(Thompson & Warburton, 1985; Guthman, 1997). As the theory had influenced Nepali 
bureaucrats (Kanel & Acharya, 2008), it was also one of the justifications to accelerate 
the implementation of CF in Nepal, whose main financial source is still international 
donors (Kanel & Acharya, 2008; Ojha, Persha, et al., 2009; Springate-Beginski et al., 
2010). 
As the political ecological approach seeks to demystify narratives and the status-quo, 
and expose unseen power relations among actors at different scales (Walker, 2006), 
analysis of discourses concerning control over and access to forest resources is 
inextricably associated with political ecology. Extension of political ecology through 
discourse analysis further sharpens its analytical capacity, which has commonly been 
adopted as a method of analysis (Neumann, 2005: 7).  
2.3 Discourse theory: a tool of political ecology 
A discourse is an attempt to fix a web of meanings within a particular domain (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001) which creates a particular way of talking about and understanding an 
                                              
16 Hegemony is a social consensus achieved without recourse to violence or coercion, but rather 
through articulation (Cox, 1983) 
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aspect of the world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010). It emerges through a talk or discussion 
which is articulated – relying on cultural and political context – by an individual or an 
organization to produce an intended meaning. Articulation is an act or process which 
establishes relations between words by distorting and/or modifying their independent 
meanings. The words are therefore treated as signs17 which interpret other signs in the 
analysis of discourses (Paper II). Laclau & Mouffe (2001: 105) say; 
The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we 
[will] call discourse. 
A discourse can be a perspective of social actors and organizations such as politicians, 
conservationists, academicians (Fairclough, 2012). It is therefore a special form of social 
practice, which should be understood as (1) a language text, written or spoken; (2) a 
discursive practice, text production and interpretation; and (3) a socio-cultural practice, 
with impacts on individual and organization (Fairclough, 1995). An articulated 
discourse can therefore dominate in a society which masks people’s real interests 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010: 32). Dominant discourses may later be implemented as 
policies and laws which undoubtedly affect local resource users (Benjaminsen & Overå, 
2011). Analysis of discourses, in addition to unpacking articulated texts, can explore 
how a particular knowledge of society becomes dominant and common sense, while 
simultaneously silencing other interpretations (Waitt, 2010). 
As discourses are embedded in material social practices, they can be performative as 
well as descriptive  (Dittmer, 2010). Discourse theory suggests that knowledge is created 
through regular interactions, so it is contingent. Being an action, an emergence and 
practice of discourse can be thus seen as an exercise of power (Fairclough, 1995; 
Jørgensen & Phillips, 2010; Fairclough, 2012; Rear, 2013). Broadly speaking, discourse 
theory, which is also called discourse analysis, is rooted in two school of thoughts. The 
first advocates that discourse is constitutive of society, thereby all social relations, 
ideologies, identities, conventions and so on are parts of discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 
                                              
17 A sign is a something physical, perceivable by our senses; it refers to something other than 




2001: 107-111). It does not consider a rule-bound society prior to discourses. 
Consequently, other social fields like the economy, infrastructure and institutions are 
also parts of discourse. It rejects a world outside discourse, and simultaneously rejects 
non-discourses (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 107). The second school of thought holds that 
discourse is both constitutive and constituted by society through a dialectical relation 
between discursive and non-discursive social practices (Fairclough, 1995: 96-98; 2012). 
It assumes the pre-existence of rule-bound society and its structures (norms, rules, 
institutions). Jørgensen & Phillips (2010: 20) categorize the first school of thought as 
poststructuralist and the second as structuralist discourse theories. Both have been used 
as analytical tools while analyzing the political ecological character of a phenomenon 
(Demeritt, 2005; Neumann, 2005: 7; Walker, 2006). Escobar (1996: 326), advocating 
the poststructuralist analysis of discourse in political ecology, says; 
[T]he poststructuralist analysis of discourse is not only a linguistic theory; 
it is a social theory, a theory of the production of social reality which 
includes the analysis of representations as social facts, inseparable from 
what is commonly thought of as ‘material reality’. 
In Paper II, in addition to the above theoretical foundation, the methodological 
dimensions of both school of thoughts have been explained with an objective to show 
how discourse analysis can be a methodological tool to scrutinize texts under the aegis 
of REDD+. A brief summary of them is given below. 
For Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 112 [emphasis in original]), the poststructuralists, an 
articulatory practice begins at the nodal point, which is a privileged sign that succeeds 
to attain a paramount position among existing signs. For instance, REDD+ introduces 
itself as a solution to an ecological as well as a social problem. A nodal point gains 
exclusive status through the articulation of elements (Ibid: 105 [emphasis in original]). 
Elements are also signs but their meanings are yet to be fixed by a nodal point. The 
elements whose meaning had been fixed by discourse are called moments (Ibid: 105 
[emphasis in original]). The form of relation of elements with the nodal point is indicated 
by field of discursivity (Ibid: 111 [emphasis in original]). The signs used to articulate 
REDD+ are all either elements or moments of REDD+, or under the field of discursivity 
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of REDD+. For instance, in the REDD+ piloted districts of Nepal, deforestation, carbon 
sequestration, poverty reduction and aid mechanism are examples of elements or 
moments whose individual discourses are under the aegis of REDD+. Those signs which 
are not in the position of elements or moments are called floating signifiers (Ibid: 113). 
For example, the role of CF in REDD+, inclusion of traditional institutions like that of 
Mustang, the possibility of recentralization of CF, and the government’s intervention 
through the declaration of new conservation areas are some of the floating signifiers in 
the context of REDD+ in Nepal. 
Fairclough (2012: 9), the structuralist who prefixed ‘critical’ in front of discourse 
analysis, sees relations between elements as material and discursive, thereby they are 
dialectical. He finds discourse analysis critical and normative as well as explanatory 
because it not only describes the realities, but also establishes, explains and evaluates 
them as the effects of social structures (inequalities in wealth and access to various 
goods). In the model he developed, called three-dimensional method of discourse 
analysis (see figure 2 in Paper II), he not only tries to bridge language with society but 
also crystalizes a link between social structures and practices. In the model, he links 
regular social relations and behaviors (socio-cultural practices) and text production and 
interpretation (articulatory practices), which are mediated by existing discourses 
(discursive practices). 
Finally, Paper II recommends combining Laclau & Mouffe’s concepts of nodal point 
and elements with Fairclough’s three-dimensional method to scrutinize REDD+ in 
Nepal and elsewhere. 
In this study, the adoption of discourse analysis to execute political ecology fills the 
hiatus of theory and methodology while analyzing control over and access to forest 
resources. As data are the preconstituted concepts of respondents, their meaning can be 
evaluated only in relation to the context of their production (Burawoy, 1991b), so they 
are discursive by virtue. 
Epistemologically, the terms ‘political’ and ‘ecology’ stand for two different approaches 
to knowledge. ‘Ecology’ is objective and more related to environmental science, 
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whereas ‘political’ is subjective and socially constructed by different actors of society 
(see Blaikie & Oliver, 2007). However, according to Neumann (2005: 8), political 
ecologists incorporate ‘ecology’ in their analysis in two ways: as a source of empirical 
evidence and as a subject of critical analysis. In this study, presentation of the state of 
forest coverage, carbon storage and their environmental consequences are the empirical 
evidences of ‘ecology’. I have considered the ‘political’ aspect of political ecology in 
three ways: as a subject of analysis of community relations with forests through local 
interactions; as a subject to analyze variations in access to local forests; and as a subject 
to assess the policies devised to manage community forests. The application of political 
ecology, thus, enables me to examine discursively (1) how forests are being managed, 
(2) who has access to forest products, forest benefits, and access to and control over 
forest managements, and (3) how context, that is, REDD+, affects forestry institutions 
and simultaneously gets feedback from local interactions. This study is guided by these 
notions of political ecology where I have discussed the diverse management institutions, 
their regulations, and contested distribution of resources and access to forests. In this 
line, specifically, in Paper I, I have analyzed how forest users’ access was hampered 
after the introduction of REDD+ pilot project, and how the distribution of REDD+ 
money created an antagonistic sentiment among some of the users. Paper II, as stated 
earlier, discusses the potential application of discourse analysis in the context of 
REDD+. The knowledge I have gained from this Paper has been supportive to analyze 
informants’ discourses in all Papers. Paper III presents disjunctive and conjunctive 
relations between formal and traditional institutions, and analyzes complementary and 
conflicting rights to use, manage and access to local forests. Paper IV critically assesses 
two of CF policies and analyzes the potential reasons of why some communities accept 
implemented CF model and why others resist it. Finally, the political ecological thinking 
also helps me to make sense of historical process of forest policy outcomes in Nepal 




3. Fieldwork and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Methodology entails a research strategy that outlines selection of study sites, method of 
data collection, fieldwork process, researcher’s positionality and subjectivity, unit of 
study, samples and mode of data analysis. In this chapter, I will present the methodology 
used in this study in details. 
3.2 Why Mustang and Dolakha? Selection of the cases 
Three reasons motivated me to select Mustang and Dolakha districts as two case study 
sites for this study. 
Firstly, the influential position of the Thakali community in the management of local 
forests of Mustang has been largely neglected in academic research. As the present 
influence of Thakali on local political ecology is historically rooted (Paper IV), studying 
this issue in the context of REDD+ can provide new knowledge for the future 
implementation of forestry governance. Additionally, the selection of Thakali villages 
where the forests are conjointly managed by formal and traditional institutions is an 
opportunity to analyze how future changes in forestry institutions could be affected by 
the interrelationship between traditional and modern institutions. Dolakha, being a 
pioneer district for the implementation of CF program in Nepal during the 1970s, was 
also one of the pioneer districts for the implementation of REDD+ pilot project in 2010. 
The pilot project was one of the largest in Nepal (see Shrestha et al., 2014), and, in 2013, 
it was coming toward the end of its program. Conducting fieldwork at the end of the 
pilot project made it possible to study how communities shared its effects. As Dolakha 
not only had a fluctuating history of forest management policy (Paper IV) but was also 
the site for an emerging forestry governance, selection of this district as one of the case 
study sites could provide knowledge of how forest users were affected after the 
implementation of a REDD+ pilot project and how forest communities perceived 
REDD+ per se. 
Secondly, in addition to the influence of traditional institutions, the forests of Mustang 
are managed by the Conservation Area Management Committees (CAMCs) under the 
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Conservation Area Management Regulation of 1996, and Dolakha’s forests are 
managed by forming the Community Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) under the Forest 
Regulation of 1995 (Paper IV). Like Dolakha, which was one of the pioneer districts for 
the CF program under the Forest Act of 1993, Mustang was also a pioneer of 
implementing conservation CF under the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 
of 1973. Presentation of these divergent management institutions places this study in a 
unique position. As most studies regarding the community forestry of Nepal focus on 
CFUGs or the management institutions designed under the Forest Act of 1993, the 
selection of two different CF institutions allows me to provide cumulative knowledge 
that may be illuminating for the emerging framework of forestry governance. 
Thirdly, the selection of these districts is also due to my previous experience working in 
these areas. I worked in Mustang as part of my M. Phil’s fieldwork in 2007 and was 
involved in fieldwork in Dolakha in 2012 (see below). My knowledge of the study areas 
both geographically and socially in advance of fieldwork and the opportunity to draw 
on existing contacts eased my access to the field and also reduced data fallacy. 
3.3 Study area: Dolakha and Mustang districts of Nepal 
Dolakha and Mustang districts share their northern borders with China (Map 1). Among 
the five Development Regions of Nepal, Dolakha and Mustang Districts belong to the 
Central and Western Development Regions, respectively. Although both districts belong 
to the Himalayan region, they are different in terms of geography and people (see 
appendix 2 for caste-ethnic composition). 
Dolakha ranges from 732 to 7148 meters above sea level (masl), and covers 2191 square 
kilometers of land. It receives an average of 2043.5 mm of rainfall annually and has 
approximately 70% of its land area with a slope greater than 30° (DDC, 2008). Being 
located on the windward side of the Himalaya, the average annual temperature of 
Dolakha ranges between 8° to 18°C, and receives more rainfall during the monsoon 
season (Ibid). 
According to the 2011 census, the total population of Dolakha is 186,557 with average 
annual growth rates between 2001-2011 of -0.91 (CBS, 2014). Agricultural land 
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occupies 28% of the total land, and agriculture, livestock rearing and migration are the 
primary livelihood activities (Ibid). The forest is an inextricable component of the local 
livelihoods (DDC, 2008). 
Dolakha district is further divided into 51 Village Development Committees (VDCs) 
and 1 Municipality. VDC and Municipality are the lowest administrative and political 
units of the Nepal government.18 Of them, Lakuridada and Magapauwa19 were selected 
for this study (Map 1).20 As a VDC contains several villages and hamlets (tols), more 
than 20 settlements were visited during the survey (see appendix 3). The study villages, 
which are located between approximately 1500 to 2700 masl, belong to subtropical-to-
temperate climatic zones (Lillesø et al., 2005). The villages of Dolakha are relatively 
scattered where less than 10 households to more than 65 households have been observed. 
A total of 924 households in Lakuridada VDC and 284 households in the study villages 
of Magapauwa VDC are inhabited (CBS, 2012). Newar is the main community of the 
Dolakha study villages, which is followed by Tamang, Kshetri, Thami and Brahman 
(see Gurung, 2007 for the caste system of Nepal). Newar, Tamang and Kshetri comprise 
more than 90% of the total population of the study villages. Except for the Buddhist 
Tamang, all of the communities follow the Hindu religion. The caste - ethnic affiliation 
of the respondents has been presented in appendix 4 & 5, and see appendix 6 for the 
total population of the VDCs by caste/ethnicity. 
Forest area covers 47.4% of Dolakha district (DDC, 2008). The forest is mainly covered 
by chir pine (Pinus roxburghii: e.g., known locally as gobre salla), blue pine (Pinus 
wallichiana: rani salla), oak species (Quercus glauca: e.g., baajh) and alder species 
(Alnus nepalensis: e.g., utis) (www.ansab.org, accessed on 07 June 2014). 
                                              
18 The government of Nepal has recently restructured the VDCs and municipalities and 
converted them into Gaupalikas and municipalities (MoFALD, 2017). At present, there are two 
municipalities and seven Gaupalikas in Dolakha District. 
19 According to the recent federal restructure of the country, Lakuridada VDC belongs to the 
Bhimeshwor Municipality and Magapauwa VDC belongs to Sailung Gaupalika. 
20 See Paper I for the specified location map. 
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Map 1: Study area21 
 
Mustang ranges from 1640 to 7061 masl and covers 3573 square kilometers of land. It 
receives less than 200 mm of rainfall annually (70 mm in the upper region) and has more 
than 83% of its land area with a slope greater than 30° (DDC, 2014). The average annual 
temperature ranges between 0 and 17°C (Ibid). Most parts of Mustang are located on 
the leeward side, so it is a rain shadow district of the Himalaya, receiving less rainfall 
during the monsoon. 
                                              




According to the 2011 census, the total population of Mustang is 13,452, with average 
annual growth rates between 2001-2011 of -1.08 (CBS, 2014). Althgough agriculture is 
one of the main means of earning local livelihoods, only 2% of the total land of Mustang 
is classified as agricultural land (DDC, 2014). In addition to agriculture, tourism, 
buisness and migration are other sources of earning livelihoods (NTNC, 2008). The 
forest is an important component of local livelihoods (Paper III). 
Mustang district is further divided into 16 VDCs.22 Of them Jomsom and Marpha23 were 
selected for this study (Map 1). Since the district adheres to traditional practices of forest 
management, two compact villages, Thini in Jomsom VDC and Syang in Marpha 
VDC,24 were selected (see appendix 4, 5 and 6 for the caste-ethnic composition). The 
study villages, which are located between approximately 2700 to 3000 masl, belong to 
cold temperate zones (Lillesø et al., 2005). Thini and Syang contain a total of 115 and 
235 households respectively (DDC, 2014). They are inhabited predominantly by the 
Thakali community, which comprise about 70% of the total population. Pariyar and 
Bishwakarma25 are the second largest, the third is Gurung, and recently migrated 
households from other districts comprise the fourth. The third and fourth category of 
households are mostly sharecroppers, tenants and those taking care of migrants’ 
properties. Except for the Hindu castes of Pariyar and Bishwakarma, all other 
communities are Buddhist. 
                                              
22 According to the recent federal restructure of the country, Mustang district has five 
Gaupalikas (MoFALD, 2017). 
23 According to the recent federal restructure of the country, Jomsom and Marpha VDCs belong 
to Gharapjhong Gaupalika.  
24 See Paper III for the specified village level location map. 
25 Lower caste communities who are also known as dalit were previously categorised as 
‘untouchables’ (DFID & WorldBank, 2006; Aahuti, 2007). 
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Photo 1: Thini village of Mustang and Surke village of Dolakha 
 
According to myth, there was forest even in the upper Mustang 200 years ago (Peissel, 
1968: 213), but at present only 3.24% of the total land is covered by forest (NTNC, 
2008). Mainly maple (Acer species: known locally as pangre), blue pine (Pinus 
wallichiana: rani salla) and rhododendrons are found in the lower region, while at the 
higher elevations conifers (Juniperus species: e.g., dhupi, Abies species: talis patra) and 
birch (Betula utilis: bhojpatra) are found (DDC, 2014). 
3.4 Positionality during fieldwork 
Fieldwork is an intensive interaction between a researcher and a targeted population 
over a substantial period of time (Briggs, 1986: 7). It is a dynamic process which does 
not happen in a social vacuum (Dowling, 2010). Researcher and respondents are 
affected by their own socio-cultural background, meaning that their age, gender, 
caste/ethnicity, occupation, religion, region etc. can all either inhibit or support the 
research process (England, 1994; Banks, 1998). Recognizing our own position as well 
as that of the respondents while exploring situated knowledge about the phenomenon 
under study is conceptualized as ‘positionality’ and ‘self-reflexivity’ in human 
geography (Rose, 1997). England (1994 [emphasis in original]) defines reflexivity as a 
self-critical and self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher. Being 
reflexive means presenting the situations that one has experienced during the data 
collection process, which is in fact crucial to the research and its results (Berreman, 
 
(1) Thini village (2879masl)    (2) Surke village (1865masl) 
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1962). Based on these epistemologies, the following sections present my positionalities 
during fieldwork. 
The fieldworks for this study lasted a total of five months and were undertaken during 
the periods August - November 2013 (2.5 months), July – September 2014 (1.5 months), 
and November – December 2015 (1 month). Since the main festivals of Nepal (dashain 
& tihar) fall during October and November, breaks were taken during the fieldwork. 
Both study districts are far from my home district. Although my parents both migrated 
from neighboring districts of Dolakha, I was born and grew up in the southern Tarai 
plain (Sarlahi District). The people I interacted with, especially in Mustang, were 
therefore completely different in terms of region, caste/ethnicity, and society. In the case 
of Dolakha, some of the respondents were similar to my cultural background, although 
the geography of the study area was completely different. 
As I indicated in the earlier section, I had visited both study districts prior to 
commencing the PhD program. My familiarity with the study areas was very useful for 
initiating the fieldwork. Initially, in Mustang in 2014, the senior members of the village 
with whom I had previously conversed were unable to recognize me (photo: 3 of the 
subsection 3.5.3). However, the former CAMC head who hardly remembered me when 
I met him on the way to Mustang became a ‘door opener’ after my reintroduction. Some 
villagers expressed that although they recognized me, they couldn’t place me, while 
others looked at me with an expression of familiarity or confusion. My repeated 
presence in the villages increased the perceived trustworthiness of my research 
activities. My knowledge about their social structure from the MPhil’s fieldwork helped 
me to demonstrate familiarity with their culture and traditions during the interviews, 
which facilitated the collection of additional data. 
I was in Dolakha in 2012 with eight other colleagues to carry out a household survey as 
a part of the Himalayan Climate Change Adaptation Program (HICAP), which was 
funded by the Norwegian Government and administered by the International Centre for 
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Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).26 During this fieldwork, I met several 
villagers who later helped me to extend my contacts during the PhD fieldwork. These 
contacts especially helped me to meet CFUG members and those who were involved in 
piloting REDD+ in the VDCs. 
The positional space that I gained from my previous experiences influenced my 
fieldwork process. In Mustang I mostly remained a student, but sometimes I was also 
positioned as a consultant and a researcher. Being a PhD student of a foreign university 
some people, especially youths, were curious to know about international education and 
the admissions process. I happily shared my knowledge with them and in exchange I 
was able to collect information about important people in the villages. For instance, in 
Syang village, which I had not visited during my MPhil fieldwork, whilst sharing 
information about international education with local youths I could ask them about 
individuals who might have knowledge of forest management and the local traditions. 
The CAMC’s head of Marpha VDC and the village headman of Syang village, with 
whom I talked to several times, were brought to my attention. Two teachers whom I had 
also interviewed during my MPhil fieldwork, and some people of Jomsom (the district 
headquarter of Mustang) positioned me as a researcher. They had heard about REDD+ 
and were curious to know more about it. After interviewing them I understood how 
deeply the tradition of using forests was rooted in the villagers’ habits. 
One of my contacts in Dolakha, a roadside teashop owner, introduced me to a local 
CFUG member who later helped me to expand my list of contacts to other CFUG 
members. When the teashop owner introduced me for the first time, he said “this sir was 
from ICIMOD last year”. Initially, I did not think anything of his introduction. Later, 
upon reflection, I realized that it had given a positive impression to the person to whom 
I was being introduced. This was because at that time ICIMOD had thrice distributed 
the REDD+ fund to local CFUGs in collaboration with the Asian Network of 
Sustainable Agriculture and Bio-resources (ASNAB) and the Federation of Community 
                                              
26 ICIMOD outsourced the fieldwork part of this project to the Nepal Development Research 
Institute (NDRI), a Kathmandu-based NGO, where I used to work as a Research Associate. 
NDRI assigned me to carry out the project as a Project Coordinator. 
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Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN), who had been implementing the REDD+ pilot 
project in the local CFUGs of the Charanawati Watershed (Paper I). ICIMOD, ANSAB 
and FECOFUN therefore all enjoyed very good reputation among the CFUGs. In 
addition, as I had coordinated a survey in 2012, the early informants took me as a bikase 
hakim (an officer from an NGO or INGO). After having frequent contact with key 
individuals, I established my position as a PhD researcher. When I was a bikase hakim, 
my relation with the respondents was probably not reciprocal, but rather would have 
been exploitative (Dowling, 2010). Informants could have taken me as a person who 
might have access to INGOs and could therefore bring a development project like the 
REDD+ pilot project to the villages. However, when I succeeded in switching my 
position to that of a PhD researcher, I felt sometimes as an ‘insider’ and sometimes as 
an ‘outsider’. In Mustang, I also occasionally felt ‘avoided’. 
Having fluctuating positions reminded me of Banks’s (1998) typology of the insider-
outsiders. Banks explored four types of insider-outsiders while doing social research. 
First is the indigenous-insider, who is perceived as a legitimate member by the 
community because this person endorses the unique values, perspectives, behaviors, 
beliefs and knowledge of his or her community. Second is the indigenous-outsider, who 
has been socialized and also belongs to the same indigenous community but has 
experienced high levels of cultural assimilation into an outsider or oppositional 
community, and whose values, beliefs, perspectives and knowledge are therefore 
aligned with those of the outsider community. The third type is the external-insider who 
does not belong to the studied community but has rejected many of the values, beliefs 
and knowledge of his or her own community and endorsed those of the studied 
community. This individual, according to Banks, is viewed as a new member or as an 
adopted insider. The last type is the external-outsider, who has been socialized in a 
different community and has only partial understanding of and little appreciation for the 
values, perspectives and knowledge of the studied community. 
In Dolakha, the influence of NGOs and INGOs on local development is substantial. 
Some CFUG members and elites were aware of the benefits that they could potentially 
gain from such organizations, and so I therefore got a lot of attention while I was 
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perceived as a bikase hakim at the early stage of fieldwork. Once they understood that I 
was a mere student and not able to bring any such project, it started to take longer to get 
appointments for interviews. Later I realized that this was not only related to my position 
as a student, but also to the high frequency with which these persons were interviewed 
by I/NGOs and researchers. Since Dolakha is located about 150 kilometers northeast of 
Kathmandu, several I/NGOs have selected it and its neighboring areas 
(Sindhupalchowk, Kavrepalanchowk, Ramechhap districts) as their pilot district or the 
areas for baseline surveys concerning their respective projects. Key individuals, 
including many villagers, have been extensively interviewed over the last decade. Being 
in an area similar to mine in terms of culture, I was an insider, but being in the 
overwhelmingly researched area I was outsider. However, I never felt avoided in 
Dolakha. Perhaps, in Dolakha, I was the indigenous-outsider in terms of my social and 
cultural affinities. 
In Mustang, the culture and community were completely different from those of 
Dolakha as well as from my own. Although I was aware of their unique traditions to 
some extent, I still did not belong to their community. I explicitly was the external-
outsider in Mustang. Due to repeatedly being present in the villages, my face was known 
to many villagers. However, compared to my experiences during the MPhil fieldwork, 
this time I noticed that many villagers were less interested in talking to me. Since ethnic 
politics have recently increased in Nepal (Paudel, 2016a), I initially thought that their 
decreased interest to talk with me was due to my social background of being Hindu and 
Brahman (so-called high caste in Hindu society), but later realized that there were other 
factors which inhibited the early stage of my fieldwork. Firstly, since one of the studied 
village’s forests was recently merged with CAMC (in 2012), the villagers had mixed 
reactions to this change (Paper III). Some of them even avoided talking about it. 
Secondly, when I was in the field, especially in November 2015, the villagers had just 
harvested the buckwheat and so were busy ploughing and manuring their fields in 
preparation to sow barley. Due to their busy schedules in the fields, some respondents 
could not spare enough time to talk with me. In addition, some respondents simply did 
not show interest while talking. Sometimes I visited respondents at their homes in the 
evening – of course with their expressed permission - which may not have been the ideal 
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time for some informants, having worked hard all day in the fields. It was particularly 
during this period that I had to contact key individuals several times in order to arrange 
a meeting. If I had not mobilized local field assistants, it would have been difficult to 
complete the fieldwork in Mustang. 
I was also in the field with my personality, ability and academic as well as social 
knowledge and skills, all of which I found instrumental to carrying out the fieldwork, 
even in such varied cultures and geographies. Moser (2008) points out that an 
individual’s mental and emotional abilities have an impact on the research process and 
outcome. The respondents and I communicated in Nepali, which not only made it 
possible to understand the direct answers of the questions that I asked, but also helped 
me to understand their reactions and facial expressions. I was aware that a respondent 
could share information in different message forms (auditory, visual), relying on local 
codes (linguistic, nonverbal) and social situations (context: location, time) (Briggs, 
1986: 41). Information from these sources could have been missed if I was not familiar 
with the local social settings.  
Furthermore, I showed patience during the interviews. I never began the survey without 
informants’ consent. After explaining my interest, purpose, need and importance of 
talking with them, I always took their consent, and marked with yes/no in each survey 
questionnaire to ensure it.  I met key informants in advance to build a rapport with them. 
While conduting the interviews, I strived to be a good listener (Silverman, 2011: 161), 
and remained flexible (in terms of time and the issues they would like to discuss) until 
the end of the interviews. 
Informants’ were fully assured that they could leave the interview at any time and skip 
any question. They were assured that the information they provided would solely be 
used for academic purposes and without mentioning their name. I participated in local 
traditional festivals. I visited respondents' homes whenever they wanted me to come. I 
never took any photographs without prior consent. I never oriented myself politically, 
religiously and socially to any groups, political parties or religious communities. I 
therefore succeeded not only to establish some enduring contacts with villagers, but also 
collected the desired information, which I will explain in more detail below. 
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3.5 Research design, approach and techniques 
Research design invokes a connection between participant community and interpretative 
community (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016). The former refers to the people with whom 
we interact, survey and talk (i.e., informants), and the latter refers to the people who 
interpret trustworthiness, rigor and credibility of the knowledge we produce (i.e., 
readers). Based on this epistemology, this study attempts to link the two communities 
through the two cases, which requires a case study method. 
3.5.1 Case study method 
The three reasons for selecting the two cases explicitly denote that the selection of cases 
are inherently particular in terms of society, place and their importance to the 
interpretative community (Burawoy, 1991a). Selection of a case, therefore, is not 
“natural” but is an analytical construct aiming to organize knowledge about reality in a 
manageable way (Lund, 2014 [emphasis in original]). Indeed, there are instances where 
a case needs a researcher to find a solution to a problem, such as in action research 
(Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016). 
Theoretically, there are two ways of knowing a case. They are concrete and abstract. 
Concrete cases are discrete sets of events and actions which an observer can discern, 
whereas the abstract cases, which participants may experience but are not easily 
discernible, need to be established through concepts (Lund, 2014). For instance, ‘forest 
management in Nepal’ is an abstract case, but ‘effect of REDD+ on the community 
forestry of Dolakha’ is an example of a concrete case. However, the concrete cases can 
be interpreted as abstract cases through concepts and theories. For instance, ‘effect of 
REDD+ on the community forestry of Dolakha’ can be interpreted though the concept 
of political ecology which can link management activities and policies at different scales 
from local to national level, and can show how forests are being managed in Nepal in 
general and how it is in Dolakha in particular. The concrete and abstract cases are 
contingent in space and time. 
In an empirical sense, a case, according to Gerring (2007: 19), ‘connotes a spatially 
delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of 
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time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference  attempts to explain’. A 
case study, therefore, analyses a social phenomenon specific to time and place (Ragin, 
1992: 2). 
The case study approach is an appropriate method when research is exploring what is 
going on in a particular situation (Hammersley & Gomm, 2009: 7), seeks to understand 
complex social phenomena (Yin, 2014: 4) and needs to improve understanding (Stake, 
2009: 11). A case, according to Yin (2014: 4 [emphasis in original]), needs to be 
examined when we: (1) need to answer “how” and “why” questions; (2) are dealing with 
a contemporary set of events; (3) cannot manipulate the behaviour of the cases under 
study; and (4) want to cover contextual conditions because they are relevant to our study 
(however the boundaries between phenomena and context may not be clear). Since my 
research requires me to answer “how” and “why” questions and the emerging context 
(i.e., REDD+) is relevant to the phenomenon under study, the case study method was 
suitable to apply. Importanly, the cases of this study are concrete cases by nature, and 
require in-depth understanding and detailed examination in order to analyze the 
interactions of community forestry institutions with emerging forestry governance and 
traditional institutions. ‘Case study method’ is endowed with these abilities (Stake, 
1994; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2014). 
Stake (1994: 237) heuristically identifies three types of case study: intrinsic, 
instrumental and collective. The first is undertaken because of intrinsic interest in, for 
instance, this particular child, curriculum or CFUG of a village. It does not primarily 
intend to represent other cases and does not illustrate a particular trait. This kind of study 
is conducted because the case itself is of interest. The purpose of this type of case is not 
theory-building but to enhance one's understanding of a particular phenomenon. 
The second, incorporating existing contexts, scrutinizes a case in-depth in order to 
provide insight into an issue or to refine existing theory. This type of case study 
facilitates the broadening of our understanding because it helps us to pursue the external 
interest. It may be seen as typical of other cases. Stake (Ibid) clarifies that there is no 
clear line to differentiate intrinsic case studies from instrumental. 
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The third – the collective case study - is an extention of several instrumental case studies. 
The cases are jointly studied in order to examine a given phenomenon, of which it is 
believed that the collective cases will lead to a better understanding. The study of 
collective cases could be instrumental to better theorizing the results. The cases of this 
study are instrumental (Paper I & III), and they are also collectively analyzed (Paper 
IV). 
3.5.2 Sampling 
In order to produce data on the selected cases, I have applied quantitative and qualitative 
data collection techniques (see below). Purposive sampling method (Gobo, 2007; 
Tongco, 2007; McGuirk & O'Neill, 2010) has been applied to select informants. The 
aim of purposive sampling, according to Patton (2002: 46), is to select information-rich 
informants who can illuminate the questions under study and put empahsis on in-depth 
understanding. 
As stated earlier, the cases were purposively selected based on their historical and 
political significance. The purposive sampling method for household survey was 
however not initially intended, although it did become the most reliable way to carry out 
the fieldworks. Originally, in 2013, a systematic random sampling method was adopted, 
with a five household gap between two surveyed households. It became immediately 
apparent however that the technique was ineffective due to widespread adult migration 
from the study villages and the existence of dispersed settlements. 
As presented in Paper IV, the migration of adult people was widespread in the study 
villages. Consequently, I had problems finding adult informants in the sampled 
households. Initially in such instances I skipped such sampled households and moved to 
the next one for the sake of randomization. Still, it was uncertain I would find an adult. 
There were also several instances when I encountered abandoned houses or houses 
without a household head. I had to keep skipping these houses as well. As most of the 
surveyed households lacked enough labor to maintain their agroforestry practices, some 
respondents were reluctant to give enough time to talk. It was not because s/he did not 
want to talk with me but s/he was needed in the household chores. These situations 
compelled me to familiarize myself with local contexts and talk with those people who 
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were present, who were well informed, and who could spend some time with me. After 
all, the intention of conducting fieldwork is to collect required data in trustworthy ways. 
Demeritt (2001: 309) reminds us: 
All science, even the very “hardest” varieties, involves contingent social 
relations. How to conduct this experiment or measurement? Whether to 
trust that datum or result? Whose interpretation to believe?  
There was a special moment when I stopped doing random sampling for household 
survey and started to select informants purposively. To conduct a survey, I needed either 
a household head or an adult member of that household who had sufficient knowledge 
about local forest management practices. One day in a settlement called Rol of 
Lakuridada (Dolakha District) in 2013, the house that was selected randomly for survey 
was headed by a 16 year old girl who was taking care of her two siblings, a sister of 14 
and a brother of 11. Both her parents had migrated to Malaysia for earnings during the 
fieldwork period. I did talk with her. She knew almost nothing about forest management 
and she was very timid to answer the questions. Except for the demographic composition 
of her household, most of the questions were left unanswered. This event raised two 
questions in my mind. (1) Should I survey an informant or a house for the sake of 
randomization? (2) Should I look for information-rich cases or just increase the number 
of houses for the sake of large sample size? The answers were clear to me: I deployed 
purposive sampling and searched for information-rich informants.   
The settlement patterns of the study areas, especially of Dolakha, are dispersed and 
scattered. It was impossible to find the needed households with adults within a 
settlement so I had to keep travelling from one settlement to another. I started to collect 
names of some key persons of the next settlement from the informants being surveyed. 
After all, the intention was to find informed informants, which was more likely if I did 
select them purposively. I therefore surveyed not only in a house where a family with at 
least an adult member lives but also in agricultural fields where people work, and in 
taverns and shops where people gather, take rest, and socialize. Concerning the 
purposive sampling method, Patton (2002: 40) says; 
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‘Cases for study (e.g., people, organizations, communities, cultures, events, 
critical incidences) are selected because they are “information rich” and 
illuminative, that is, they offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of 
interest; sampling, then, is aimed at insight about the phenomenon, not 
empirical generalization from a sample to a population.’ 
It was crucial to find informed informants because data represent the preconstituted 
theories and concepts of respondents (Burawoy, 1991b) which could have a lasting 
impact on my study. The purposive sampling method, which has at least been used since 
1940 (Patton, 2002: 46), is a well-established method of data collection and analysis 
(Patton, 2002: 243; Gobo, 2007; McGuirk & O'Neill, 2010; Stratford & Bradshaw, 
2016). It allows a researcher to use a variety of data collection techniques (qualitative 
and quantitative) and data sources (oral and archive) (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Baxter & Jack, 
2008; Yin, 2014), and has also been used by both social and natural scientists (Tongco, 
2007). Actually, according to Bryman (2012: 418) – ‘[m]ost sampling in qualitative 
research entails purposive sampling of some kind.’ Data collected from purposive 
sampling can be used for both qualitatively and quantitatively (Tongco, 2007).  
Based on the above epistemological rigor of the case study method, I have collected data 
from household surveys, semi-structured interviews and group conversations. Data were 
also collected from observation and secondary sources. 
3.5.3 Unit of study, Sample size and Data collection 
The unit of this study has to be understood in a hierarchical sense. In general, a forest 
management institution is a unit of study. However, on the one hand, as a forestry 
institution is constituted by its members or forest users, their households and local 
traditions, it should be understood from the perpective of users. So data were collected 
on the individual and household level representing their forest management insitutions. 
On the other hand, as a forestry institution is also governed by acts and regulations I 
have reviewed such documents to analyze how they shape forestry institutions and 
users’ attitude towards it. So, this study takes a forestry institution incorporating users’ 
attitudes as units of study to analyze the interaction of community forestry with REDD+ 
pilot project and tradtional institutions. 
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In order to have diverse perspectives from purposively sampled informants, I surveyed 
more than 60 households during each fieldwork (table 2), which is described as large 
sample size for statistical analysis (Wheeler et al., 2010: 116 [emphasis in original]). 
However, empirical generalization is not the intention of this study. The collective case 
study does not aim for generalization (see Patton, 2002: 40), rather it seeks to identify 
diverse realities and conclude theoretically. 
Table 2: Data acquisition 
Data Collection 
Techniques 
Study districts and years 
Total 
Data 
Recording 2013 2014 2015 
Dolakha Mustang Dolakha Mustang   










































nts 0 13 4 8 25 
* Used a recording device with prior consent; **1 CFUG secretary and 1 CAMC head were 
interviewed for a second time in 2015; *** 3 experts were Interviewed in Kathmandu 
The diverse methods that were applied to collect data complemented each other during 
fieldworks and analysis. 
Interviewing informants through household surveys, key informant interviews, group 
discussions and informal chats was the main tool that I applied to gather the required 
information. An interview is a face-to-face communication that occurs between an 
interviewer and a respondent, where the respondent delivers messages to questions 
posed by the interviewer (Briggs, 1986). An interview has three forms; structured, semi-
structured, and unstructured (Dunn, 2010; Silverman, 2011). The first is conducted with 
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a predetermined and standardized list of questions. The second is guided by a 
predetermined checklist of questions or topics to be discussed, however there remains 
flexibility with regards to raising issues depending on how the informants respond to 
the questions (Longhurst, 2010). The third form of interview denotes an open 
conversation with interviewees. It is not guided by the predetermined questions. I 
applied the first and second forms of interview to accumulate the information. 
The household survey method was one of the primary techniques of data collection. 
The technique, which explores people’s perceptions and experiences by administering 
standardized questions to some or all of its members (Preston, 2009; McLafferty, 2010), 
was applied to carry out four such surveys during 2013-2015 (table 3). 
Table 3: Household questionnaire survey 
District VDC 
National census, 2011 Surveyed household 




villages VDC 2013 2014 2015 
Dolakha 
Lakuridada  3713 3713  924 924 93   65 
  Magapauwa 1030  2950  284  780 28   
Mustang 
Jomsom  390  1370 115  430   62 
  65 Marpha  876  1551 235  414   
Total 
 6009 9584 1558 2548 
121 62 130 
313 
Mean age of the respondents 45 50 47 
I needed to conduct household surveys for three reasons. First, it helped me to compile, 
organize and identify individual household cases in a standardized way, which have 
provided a richness of information when analyzing the cases. Second, conducting 
household surveys were also instrumental in raising micro-level issues while 
interviewing informants. For instance, household variations in access to forests, effects 
of REDD+ pilot project on households, and the role of caste-ethnicity in management 
would have been less visible if I had not conducted household surveys. For example, the 
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tradition of not selecting a non-Thakali as a village headman was initially known from 
a Dalit household. Finally, although decreasing use of forests due to migration was 
known to me anecdotally, household surveys helped me to document it thoroughly. 
The survey questions, which were designed in Nepali language and pre-tested before 
conducting the actual surveys, were mainly formulated to produce data on ordinal and 
ratio scales. The surveys also included open questions where the respondents could 
freely express their ideas, experiences and beliefs, such as ‘do you like the current forest 
management model? Why?’ and ‘which system is better for collecting forest products: 
CAMC or Mukhiya? Why?’. These open questions helped me to acquire standardized 
information about the interactions between users and their forestry insitutions. The ratio 
data, such as frequency of use of the community-managed forests and adult migration, 
allowed me to infer the decreasing use of forest due to increased adult migration in Paper 
IV. The ordinal variables in questions provided more insight into the local forest use 
patterns (Paper I & III), such as ‘which forest types do you use mostly (ranking: most 
used to least used)? and ‘what are the causes of forest growth (ranking: most important 
to least important)?’. 
Photo 2: Photo 2: Household questionnaire survey 
 
Four female and three male local assistants supported me in carrying out the household 
survey. The selection of female assistants was intentional. The involvement of rural 

















& Buchy, 2002; Nightingale, 2006; Giri & Darnhofer, 2010; Nightingale, 2011). It is 
possible that I or the male assistants would have had less access or collect less 
information than female assistants were able to do. In some instances, adult males of 
some households had migrated and we had to survey female household-heads. The 
female respondents were fully aware of local forest management. Of the surveyed 
household respondents, 64.5% were female and 35.5% were male in 2013, 34% were 
female and 66% were male in 2014, and 46% were female and 54% were male in 2015 
(see appendix 4 & 5). 
In a social research, respondents differ in terms of both their ability and willingness to 
provide detailed information, and so some informants become particularly important to 
a research who have more knowledge and have the capability to explain it verbally 
(Briggs, 1986: 8; Bryman, 2012: 439). These selected key informants (table 4) had 
these abilities. 




No. Dolakha Mustang 
Key informant 
interview 
CFUG member 4  4 
CAMC member  2 2 
Village headman  3 3 
School teacher 1  1 
Local hotelier  1 1 
Total   5 6 11 
Informal 
interview 
CFUG member 3  3 
Village headman  1 1 
School teacher 1 1 2 
FECOFUN member 3*  3 
District Forest Officer 1  1 
Ranger 1  1 
ACAP head  1 1 
Villagers (excluded from the 
household survey) 4 7 11 
Total   13 10 23 
*The national head of FECOFUN (# 1) was interviewed in Kathmandu 
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The group conversation method, differing from the conventional focus group 
discussion, was carried out spontaneously. A group conversation for my purpose means 
an accidental or unplanned conversation with more than one villager either in a local tea 
shop, in an informant’s house or at a cultural gathering. During the fieldwork, I 
participated in three such group discussions. 
This method helped not only to complement the data collection process, but also to 
traingulate the data that were being collected otherwise. It was also a useful means to 
strengthen my own position during fieldwork. For instance, in Mustang in 2014, one 
informant whom I knew from my MPhil fieldwork in 2007 took me to a local festival 
where many adult villagers were chatting in a natural setting. After having introduced 
myself, I sat nearby them for some time. Once I felt that the villagers had sufficiently 
relaxed after my introduction, I started to talk with them (photo 3). This group discussion 
helped me to resume my previous positionality as a student who revisited the village. 
Photo 3: Group conversation in Mustang, 2014 
 
I also selected 3 Nepali experts who have been working in forestry research for several 
years. All of them have published several articles and have been actively engaged in 
policy research. I have understood an expert to be a person who has institutionalized 
























































































































































for other actors (Meusar & Nagel, 2009: 19 [emphasis in original]). The selected experts 
were very helpful as a means of understanding the on-going situation with REDD+ 
activities at both the national and subnational level, and also regarding the changing 
forestry legislation of the nation. In addition, talking with such experts broadened my 
own knowledge about the national forestry situation and its management. 
The semi-structured interviews were particularly useful as a means of generating data 
regarding the traditional forest management system, villagers’ perceptions of the 
REDD+ pilot project in Dolakha, the involvement of the CAMC in Mustang and the 
problems of increasing adult migration and decreasing agricultural practices in the 
villages. The interviews also explored different perspectives, such as the government’s 
and FECOFUN’s perspective on REDD+ piloting, and the ACAP perspective on local 
forest management. Eleven villagers who were interviewed during the early stages of 
the fieldwork not only supplied information, but also helped to access other villagers 
and key informants. 
Observation is the outcome of an active choice by a researcher rather than mere 
exposure in the field, which requires an active role to determine what to see and how to 
see a phenomenon under study (Kearns, 2010: 242 [emphasis in original]). For instance, 
my understanding was widened by observing while walking inside a community-
managed forest with a CFUG head and participating in forest- and REDD+-related 
seminars and meetings. These activities helped to associate my study with ongoing local 
and national processes. For instance, I got the chance to participate in a seminar in 
Kathmandu in 2013 where the participants were researchers, NGO members and 
foresters. The seminar was designed to collect feedback on the upcoming Forestry 
Sector Strategy (see Paper I). Several discourses concerning future forest policy, 
REDD+, and climate change were debated by the participants (photo 4). Actually, the 
idea of writing about discourse analysis and REDD+ in Paper II emerged after 
participating in this seminar. Additionally, participation in such an event was very 
important to a researcher like myself because it allowed me to gain knowledge and 
experience of current affairs relating to the forest management of Nepal, and how 
experienced people foresaw the future of the national forestry institutions. 
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Photo 4: Concerns about future forest management of Nepal 
 
Likewise, while walking in the forest, I not only saw several places where trees had been 
cut down but also got the opportunity to talk at length with the CFUG head. The head 
was uncertain regarding the cutting of trees. The villagers were also aware of such 
instances taking place inside community-managed forests and had mentioned the illegal 
harvesting of timber during interviews. This observation led me to acknowledge that the 
forest is not completely secure even within the CF framework. 
Finally, information collected from secondary sources such as government documents 
and other published material plays a very important role in my study. Forestry legislation 
such as the Forest Regulation of 1995 and the Conservation Area Management 
Regulation of 1996 were reviewed while analyzing Paper III & IV. Reviewing the R-
PP27 helped me to understand the government’s motives and plans concerning REDD+ 
(Paper I). The information regarding the forest management history of Dolakha and 
                                              
27 Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) is “a framework document which sets out a clear 
plan, budget and schedule for a country to achieve REDD+ Readiness. This document is shared 
to all stakeholders within the country and submitted to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
Readiness Fund where it is independently reviewed and assessed before the grant is allocated” 
(cited from http://theredddesk.org: accessed 22 July 2016). 
In photo 4: participants of the 
seminar shared their views on 
what should be included in the 
upcoming Forestry Sector 
Strategy. Their suggestions 
mostly concentrated on the 
inclusion of issues related to 
REDD+, climate change, 
biodiversity, scientific forest 
management, poverty reduction, 
NTFP and its management, good 
governance, eco-tourism etc. 
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Mustang enabled me to analyze why the traditional institutions were still active in 
Mustang and why there were no such institutions in Dolakha in Paper IV. Additionally, 
the information of Nepali history of forest management has been entirely collected from 
secondary sources. 
3.6 Data organization and analysis 
The data embodies facts and values which are represented quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Analyzing data from both sources entails several strengths, for instance 
the triangulation of findings, and also offsets weakness (Greene et al., 1989; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2003; Bryman, 2006). The application of multiple methods and data 
complemented each other throughout the analyses. 
Coding method was adopted to organize, analyze and present the studied cases. Both 
qualitative and quantitative data are presented through this method. Coding is a process 
of categorizing the data that have some internal cohesion (Patton, 2002: 465; Cope, 
2016). Emphasizing the importance of coding in data analysis, Patton (2002: 463) adds; 
Raw field notes and verbatim transcripts constitute the undigested 
complexity of reality. … Developing some manageable classification or 
coding scheme is the first step of analysis. Without classification there is 
chaos and confusion. 
Coding creates the basis of analysis by distilling two types of categories: descriptive and 
analytic. Descriptive code reflects themes or patterns of data that are apparent on the 
surface and salient in vernacular categories as stated directly by informants (Aase, 2007; 
Cope, 2016). It was found instrumental when reviewing forestry legislation, analyzing 
informants’ direct statements, and describing the social structure of Mustang. The topic 
of Paper I actually emerged from a direct statement of an informant, that is, REDD+ 
comes with money, not with development (Paper I: 558). 
The analytic code, on the other hand, is the researcher’s categories that emerge after 
careful scrutiny of data and their contexts (Cope, 2016). For instance, two major codes 
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of Paper III and three hypotheses of Paper IV are examples of analytic coding.28 Through 
these codings I have presented findings of the situations of different actors, contested 
access to resources, and varied social structures. 
Aase (2007) suggests four methodological steps to interpret informants’ categories. 
First, a researcher has to map out the categories of the subject under study. For instance, 
the realization of two categories of forest management institutions in Mustang (i.e., 
traditional and formal) helped me to explore the diverse management responsibilities of 
the institutions (Paper III & IV). CAMCs have been trying to manage local forests, but 
due to the existence of traditional institutions (i.e., the village councils or gaun samiti in 
Nepali) in each village, they could not succeed as they had expected. Without knowing 
these management categories, any conclusion could be coincidental in the case of 
Mustang. 
The second step is to explore how the categories are constituted, or what meaning they 
possess. As explained in Paper III, the CAMCs have categorized local forests as 
'common' or 'sharable resources' among the villages that belong to a certain 
administrative unit (i.e., VDC). But each village of Mustang has a traditional institution 
to regulate the forest, which does not allow the forest to be used by other villages of the 
same VDC. They have territorialized the forest as ‘village forest’. Without interpreting 
the constituted meanings and associated practices like in Mustang, the future change in 
local forest management is unlikely to achieve success. 
The third step involves clarifying the way in which informants relate the categories to 
each other, or in other words to their context. For instance, although the REDD+ pilot 
project had been implemented for three years in Dolakha (Paper I), it was found that the 
local forestry institutions (i.e., the CFUGs) and the local forest users (i.e., the 
community) perceived of its implementation in different ways. The CFUGs saw the pilot 
project as a 'new framework' to manage local forests and a 'new way' to earn money by 
implementing it in the forests, whereas the users considered it as a development project 
lasting only a certain amount of time. As REDD+ was an alien idea in local forest 
                                              
28 Paper III & IV present that how I have used coding as an analytical tool. 
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management, the users could not subjectively accept it as CFUGs. Understanding these 
diverse interpretations of the pilot project helped me to analyze the Dolakha case. 
Finally, Aase suggests identifying informants' localization of observations in the 
respective categories. For instance, as stated earlier, CAMCs in Mustang could not 
achieve the expected levels of success. Previous studies also show that CAMCs' 
activities were not properly accepted by the northern ACAP dwellers (Spiteri & Nepal, 
2008; Khadka & Nepal, 2010). Perhaps the reasons behind this can be found in the 
perceived 'ownership' or 'actual manager' of local forests. Being the traditional 
managers, the village councils and their headmen consider managing the forests to be 
part of their customary duties. On the other hand, CAMCs, guided by the modern 
perspective of forest management have tried to manage the forests by merging the 
traditionally managed 'village forests' into a single administrative boundary, that is, the 
VDC. The conversion of forest boundary - from traditional to administrative - could 
dismantle the traditional power of village councils and village headmen. The village 
councils probably fear losing their traditional power over local forests, and so they want 
to keep holding management rights over the forests (Paper IV). Understanding the 
informants' localization of observations helped me to understand the causes and effects 
of the dual ownership and management, which have been discussed in Paper III. 
Informants’ categories and different themes were coded by following two processes: 
convergence and divergence (Patton, 2002: 465 [emphasis in original]). Convergence 
entails figuring out what things fit together and looking for recurring regularities in data 
(Ibid [emphasis in original]). Whereas divergence helps to find out codes by bridging 
different themes and verifying their existence. 
The data that were generated by the four household surveys were also analyzed through 
a ranking method (Wheeler et al., 2010: 43) that ranks the answers from the most 
important to the least important. A rank is a numerical expression of importance and is 
assigned by the respondent based on perceived degree of importance of each of the 
options provided in the survey questions. The options to be ranked were finalized after 
consulting villagers and key informants during the piloting of questions. Simple 
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statistical inferences, such as mean, percentages and frequencies were used in the 
analyses. 
Field notes and audio recordings were reviewed several times to understand and analyze 
respondents' views and interpretations. The data extracts (informant quotations) 
presented in the Papers were selected as representative of the total data (Silverman, 
2011: 356). Selecting representative statements while designing table 4 of Paper IV was 
time consuming, however it helped me to explore the local position of CAMCs, CFUGs 
and the village councils. Some of the qualitative data that were collected by the 
household surveys were also analyzed by selecting key themes, which were selected as 
per their frequency of occurrence. Table 2 of Paper I was the product of this type of 
analysis. 
3.7 Reliability and validity  
Reliability refers to whether or not the results that we have drawn from the study are 
replicable, whereas validity refers to whether the collected data are appropriate to draw 
the conclusion or not (Briggs, 1986: 23; Golafshani, 2003; Silverman, 2011: 356). It 
has, however, been argued that reality is contingent to time and space (Burawoy, 1991b; 
Braun & Wainwright, 2005; Castree, 2005; Mansvelt & Berg, 2016; Young, n.d.). 
Reaching a valid and real knowledge of a topic is an iterating process because 
observations are always theoretical (Mansvelt & Berg, 2016: 403 [emphasis in 
original]). Reliability and validity of a study are themselves therefore contingent of time-
space and they are context-dependent. 
The tradition of measuring reliability and validity comes from natural sciences 
(Mansvelt & Berg, 2016). In social sciences, how accurately we have represented the 
respondents’ perception of phenomena corresponds to the validity of a research 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000). As social phenomena and relations are dynamic, a nuanced 
interpretation of data is motley and manifold (Healy, 2017). 
Triangulation, according to Golafshani (2003), improves reliability and validity of a 
research. Denzin (cited in Patton, 2002: 247) has identified four types of triangulations: 
data triangulation (the use of variety of data sources), methodological triangulation (the 
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use of multiple methods), theory triangulation (the use of multiple perspectives), and 
investigator triangulation (the use of several researchers or evaluators). In this line, I 
present a brief note on reliability and validity of this study in the following section. 
This study has collected data from a variety of sources by applying multiple methods 
which not only enabled me to accumulate appropriate and required data but also to 
complement each other during fieldwork and analysis. For instance, although decreasing 
use of forests due to migration was recurrently stated by informants, collection of 
quantitative data from household surveys enabled me to document and analyze the 
contention systematically. The use of information from secondary sources enabled me 
to discern the historically rooted community-forest links in the study districts (Paper 
IV). Applying multiple methods, as Golafshani (2003) states, leads to a more valid and 
reliable construction of realities. Additionally, the description of the fieldwork process 
and reflexivity not only establishes transparency of this study but also takes the 
interpretative community to the center of the experience and study contexts. This also 
establishes the trustworthiness of data collection and assures the validity of this study 
(see Creswell & Miller, 2000; Silverman, 2011: 369). 
The adoption of a mixed qualitative and quantitative research design allows for 
triangulation in order to increase reliability of my research. The use of multiple concepts 
and theories to interpret data in the Papers strengthens the validity of analyses. The 
political ecological thinking enabled me to make sense of historically rooted forest 
policy outcomes of the country. Additionally, the attached Papers are evaluated by 
internal and external reviewers (e.g., the journal’s peer-reviewers), which have also 




4. Discussion and Conclusion 
4.1 Introduction 
The implementation of REDD+ as a framework of forestry governance is crucial in 
terms of addressing community rights and access to carbon benefits (Larson, 2011; 
Leach & Scoones, 2013; McDermott et al., 2013; Ojha et al., 2013; Vatn & Vedeld, 
2013; Paudel et al., 2015). In order to realize REDD+, two issues are therefore pivotal: 
conservation to curb climate change, and development to maintain local livelihoods. 
Although community forestry (CF), motivated by conservation and development, is now 
well established in Nepal, the emergence of REDD+ brings a new dimension to it. 
The historical development of forest policies in Nepal (see subsection 1.2) has firmly 
established two features, primarily in the Hill region. Firstly, the policies have succeeded 
in promoting and establishing locally initiated community-based forest management 
institutions (i.e., CF). Secondly, these community institutions have succeeded in both 
preserving and considerably enhancing forest coverage (see Niraula et al., 2013; 
subsection 1.3). Since these communities have proven to be successful at recovering and 
maintaining forests that had previously been degraded mainly as a result of the 
government land reclamation policies prior to 1957, these two features provided a secure 
platform to pilot REDD+ through local forest management institutions in 2010. 
The previous changes to CF policies and institutions of Nepal were initiated from either 
a national or local level. The emergence of REDD+, which would be another major 
policy tool in Nepal’s forest management history, originates from a global level. Finding 
synergies between local interests and national or global interests is the major concern of 
REDD+’s “road map”. In aiming to examine CF’s interactions with both emerging 
forestry governance and traditional institutions, which is the main research question of 
this study as stated in first chapter, this chapter firstly discusses the study’s findings 
relating to these interactions and their relations with REDD+. Secondly, it discusses the 
findings in relation to Common-Pool Resource (CPR) theory. Lastly, the chapter 
concludes with the main findings. 
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4.2 Interaction of community forestry with REDD+ 
REDD+ has heuristically been presented as an option to counteract the increasing levels 
of global warming and to contribute to conservation and development goals (Angelsen 
& MacNeill, 2012; Luttrell et al., 2013). However, in the case of the Community 
Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) of Dolakha (Paper I), two principal risks are apparent. 
Firstly, as the implementation of the pilot project was designed to conserve the forest 
and to sequester more carbon, some restrictions have been imposed on users, such as 
limiting the collection of forest products and banning livestock grazing. This has a 
particular impact on the poorest households for whom the forests account for four times 
more income than for better-off households (Shrestha et al., 2017). These restrictions 
have also created doubts about local users’ access to forests in the future after the full 
implementation of REDD+ or similar frameworks of forestry governance. This finding 
is in line with current studies (Neupane & Shrestha, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers, Gupta, 
et al., 2012; Maraseni et al., 2014; Poudel et al., 2014). Secondly, the income that the 
CFUGs received was not satisfactorily distributed among the different caste-ethnic 
communities because the amount of funds that were received was too small to reach 
everyone. A small portion of the fund was distributed to a few poor households of the 
villages, which served to create antagonistic sentiments among others, and therefore 
lacks social legitimacy (see Corbera & Schroeder, 2017). One of the main reasons for 
this is that non-dalit households tend to be less prioritized for support from the REDD+ 
pilot project than dalit and janajati (ethnic communities) households. These findings are 
also in line with contemporary literature (Ojha et al., 2013; Patel et al., 2013; Poudel et 
al., 2014; Saito-Jensen et al., 2014; Shrestha et al., 2017). 
The above findings clearly indicate that it is difficult to achieve the equity outcome from 
the implementation of REDD+. The piloting of REDD+ in Dolakha was therefore not 
particularly satisfactory from the users’ perspective. However, the CFUGs’ leaders were 
excited to see its future prospects and were happy to have some financial income from 
the project. For local communities, involvement in the CFUGs was a regular practice, 
whereas REDD+ was perceived as a development project which was yet to be 
internalized. It was detached from users’ traditional knowledge. The pilot project was 
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an opportunity for some actors, especially for the CFUGs’ executive members and some 
elites (see Ojha et al., 2013; Saito-Jensen et al., 2014). Studies suggest that by 
undermining local communities’ livelihoods, REDD+ cannot achieve its set goals 
(Agrawal et al., 2011; Karky & Rasul, 2011; Pistorius, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers, 
Gupta, et al., 2012; Visseren-Hamakers, McDermott, et al., 2012). 
In addition, the CFUGs do not own the rights to the land where the forests stand 
(MoFSC, 2013), which will pose significant challenges both to successfully distribute 
the REDD+ benefits and to determine the owners of below and above ground carbon 
sequestration. This finding is in line with Paudel et al. (2015) and Murdiyarso et al. 
(2012), who also foresee land tenure rights as a major challenge to reforming forest 
governance under REDD+. Ojha et al. (2013) also find that forest tenure and benefit 
sharing in the REDD+ process are both contentious issues in Nepal. 
REDD+ renders CFUGs governable by subjecting them as vehicles to increase carbon 
sequestration through the restriction of users’ access to forests. Traditional practices 
became silent as a result of the piloting of REDD+, not only because REDD+ was an 
alien concept to the users, but also because they lacked the required technical knowledge 
and understanding, and therefore had to rely on the input of outsiders. Users understood 
the project as simply a money distributing program, and saw themselves as the passive 
recipients of technical jargon concerning the implementation. The implementation of 
REDD+ can thus be perceived by some locals as tyrannical (see also Staddon et al., 
2015).29 In the same vein, the pilot project was not able to support traditional practices 
of local livelihoods as expected, such as the utilization of REDD+ money for the 
betterment of villagers. Although REDD+ money could be instrumental in advancing 
local development, its distribution could not satisfy all of the poor. Despite REDD+’s 
potential to prevent deforestation and reduce climate change, previous studies have also 
criticized it for creating conflict on a local level (Larson, 2011; Patel et al., 2013). It 
potentially poses the threat of re-centralization of forest management (Phelps et al., 
2010; Vijge et al., 2016), and can also be seen as a medium for decreasing socio-
                                              
29 Tyrannical refers to the ‘unjust exercise of power’ (Cooke & Kothari, 2004: 4). 
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economic resilience by converting natural resources into a commodity (Corbera, 2012; 
Fairhead et al., 2012; Osborne, 2015). 
Subjecting the users as poor people of developing countries by piloting of REDD+ in a 
CF is an example of a discursive practice. Since the forest is an inextricable component 
of local livelihood earnings, the discursive practice has affected the traditional practices 
of forest use. As discussed in Paper II, the REDD+ discourse becomes apparent through 
the so-called new approach to forest management. The elements and/or floating 
signifiers such as the role of CF, the access rights of users, biodiversity conservation 
and carbon sequestration all fall under the field of discursivity of REDD+. Consequently, 
REDD+ has achieved a paramount position (a ‘nodal point’) in climate change 
discourse, which is an articulatory practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Stephan et al., 
2014), devised to achieve the ‘triple-wins’ – carbon reduction, biodiversity conservation 
and poverty control (Angelsen & MacNeill, 2012; Luttrell et al., 2013). The articulatory 
practice puts in regimes of practice30 through piloting, as in the case of Dolakha. From 
this case, it can be inferred that the REDD+ pilot project has more or less succeeded in 
achieving its conservation goals at the expense of development potential. 
Besides the above flaws, the REDD+ pilot project has increased the number of trees 
being planted, and raised awareness about forest conservation. However, REDD+ must 
also harmonize the new value of carbon sequestration with the more traditional values 
of CF, that is, local livelihoods and ecology. Some families have received economic 
support for livelihood earning activities, however the support was insufficient to invest 
in livelihood enhancement activities. Instead of rigidly stating whether or not REDD+ 
is suitable in the context of Nepal, I would rather say that if the flaws discussed above 
are addressed, then it could well be an effective framework for managing the forests. 
                                              
30 A regime of practices refers to a set of activities and techniques that addresses a particular 
issue without necessarily consisting of a coherent policy program or following an overall logic 
(Stephan et al., 2014: 60). 
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4.3 Interaction between community forestry and traditional 
institution 
The relationship between forest users, their institutions and emerging forestry 
governance such as REDD+ can perhaps be best presented by discussing how accessible 
the forests are for differently positioned users. The rights to the forest, the rules for 
forest use (Larson, 2011) and access to resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003), all of which 
enhance an actor’s agency to control the benefits, are the tools to analyze local political 
ecology of interactions. In order to discern this, in Paper III I have presented the 
disjunctions and conjunctions between traditional and modern forestry institutions. 
In Mustang, the traditional institutions hold customary rights over the forests. These 
institutions exist in each village and regulate the forests alongside the formally designed 
CF institutions (i.e., the CAMCs). These two institutions constitute different actors in 
regulating the forests, such as the traditionally authorized members of the village 
council, the village headman, the CAMC, the Annapurna Conservation Area Project 
(ACAP) and its associated actors. The traditional institutions in particular, which have 
regularized patterns of behavior (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Leach et al., 
1999) and have been regulating the local forests for long time, still primarily hold the 
exclusion and withdrawal rights (Paper III). Although they share the management rights 
with the CAMCs to some extent, these traditional institutions will undoubtedly claim 
the rights over future forest benefits. Although villagers appreciate development 
initiatives undertaken by the CAMCs, some clear-cut disjunctions between the 
institutions have been identified, such as dual management and different boundaries of 
the same forests. These are basic and genuine issues that need to be addressed in future 
forest management policies. As REDD+ is considered to be a national-level program, 
these contentious issues and actors will challenge the distinction between the bundle of 
rights (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001) and the distribution of benefits equitably. This finding 
is in line with McDermott et al. (2013), who say that pre-existing conditions that either 
limit or facilitate people's access to a decision-making procedure is pivotal for the 
distribution of benefits. Before implementing any new framework of forestry 
governance, the existing disjunctions must therefore be corrected. 
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Besides the institutional plurality, the variation in different users’ access to local forests 
and management is another feature of local traditional institutions of Mustang. In-
migrants, such as those who have settled in the villages by renting or sharecropping 
migrants’ land and the employees of government and non-government organizations, 
must take on social responsibilities before accessing local forests. In spite of this, in-
migrants, including the local dalits, are not allowed to lead the traditional institutions. 
The traditional institutions, which also circumscribe the formal rules of local forest 
management, are headed by the Thakali ethnic community. These differences raise two 
issues in the context of the implementation of REDD+. First, how to incorporate 
traditional practices of forest use into the new governance system; and second, how to 
maintain and provide justice to in-migrants and dalits who are socially subordinated. 
Without solving these issues, emerging forestry governance like REDD+ will not only 
be contentious at a local level, but will also mainly benefit the local elites. 
The above discussions raise three different types of access and role that are apparent in 
local forest management. Firstly, the influential role of traditional institutions and their 
customarily determined access to local forest resources and management in general. 
Secondly, the privileged role of the Thakali community. Finally, the restricted role and 
access to local forest resources of in-migrants and reduced role in forest management 
institutions of the dalits. However, the access and rights to forests are equal as encoded 
in the Conservation Area Management Regulation of 1996 (MoFSC, 2016). In the 
context of the persistence of traditional institutions, therefore, providing rights to forest 
users through regulation like the Conservation Area Management Regulation of 199631 
do not necessarily determine and secure users’ access to forest. Previous studies also 
show that social difference to access and manage forests hold potentiality to affect local 
livelihoods when devising REDD+ as a framework of forestry governance (Larson, 
2011; Saito-Jensen et al., 2014). 
The above variations in access rights to the forests differs from Ribot and Peloso’s 
theory of access: the ability to derive benefits from resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003; 
                                              
31 This regulation is less flexible than the regulation adopted by the forest users of Dolakha 
(Paper IV).  
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see footnote 1). In Mustang, where two institutions simultaneously regulate the same 
forests, users’ abilities are controlled mainly by the traditional institutions, thereby 
limiting the effect of formal rules. The ability of local users to access the forests is less 
visible in terms of the extent to which they have access to various means that facilitate 
access, such as technology, capital, labor, knowledge and authority (cf. Ribot & Peluso, 
2003). Rather, traditionally determined social identities mold users’ ability to derive 
benefits from forest resources. 
The importance of traditional institutions and local practices to the successful 
implementation of REDD+ has been firmly recognized (Chhatre et al., 2012; Howell, 
2014; Wallbott, 2014). Studies show that without addressing traditional practices and 
their institutions, REDD+ cannot achieve success (Barr & Sayer, 2012; Visseren-
Hamakers, McDermott, et al., 2012; McDermott et al., 2013; Saunders, 2013; Vatn & 
Vedeld, 2013). As designing an institution centred on the fair distribution of forest 
benefits is a major concern in the REDD+ debate (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Corbera 
& Schroeder, 2011; Kanowski et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2011; Visseren-Hamakers, 
Gupta, et al., 2012), the solution of the existing disjunctions could help to minimize any 
problems. In order to achieve effectiveness, efficiency, and equity outcomes from the 
REDD+ implementation (Angelsen & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008; see Paper I), 
communities’ equal participation, access to forest, access to management and access to 
benefits are all essential. 
Although the strong persistence of traditional institutions like in Mustang is a feature of 
only some locations in Trans-Himalayan Nepal, the issues that have been discussed in 
Paper III can nevertheless help to make policy makers more aware of the potential 
challenges that they face. 
4.4 Factors affecting local acceptance of emerging forestry 
governance 
The communities of Dolakha and Mustang have had different reactions to the formally 
designed CF models, that is, CFUGs in Dolakha and CAMCs in Mustang (Paper IV). In 
Dolakha, although there were both negative as well as positive effects of the REDD+ 
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pilot project on local communities, the pilot project itself and the local CF were not 
resisted by the communities. Additionally, the local forest management was not 
dominated by any single case/ethnic community. In Mustang, however, this was not the 
case, and the local CF was also not fully accepted by the communities. These local 
variations in acceptance of CF models show that when forests are regulated by a society 
constituted by a dominant caste or ethnic group and traditional institution, there is a 
chance not only of contestation in terms of resource appropriation and accumulation, 
but also of local variations in the acceptance of or resistance to a formally implemented 
CF model. Moreover, these variations in local acceptance were particularly apparent in 
areas witnessing high levels of migration among local CF users (see table 2 and 3 of 
Paper IV), and where there was a concomitant lack of leadership available to run the CF 
institutions (Paper I). The lack of users’ participation and active leadership can be a 
hindrance for successful implementation of emerging forestry governance such as 
REDD+. 
Two factors can nonetheless encourage acceptance of emerging forestry governance. 
First, the extent to which the rights and access to local forests are encoded in formal 
rules and practiced by users equitably. Second, the extent of the influence of traditional 
institutions over local forest management and formal forestry institutions. For instance, 
CFUGs have much more autonomy than CAMCs to manage local forests and can 
associate with any civic organization that they wish (Paper IV). This finding is also in 
line with previous studies (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Pokharel et al., 2008; Ojha, 2014). 
The CAMCs, on the other hand, provide their users with much less flexibility (Paper 
IV). This finding is contrary to those of Baral & Stern (2011), who claim that CAMCs 
are free from control of the District Forest Office and have more secure access to funds 
as they are supported by the Annapurna Conservation Area Project. I argue that the 
institutional flexibility provided by both the rules and the possibility of earning income 
are greater in CFUGs than in CAMCs (see also Ojha, Timsina, Kumar, Belcher, et al., 
2008; Pokharel et al., 2008; Thoms, 2008). Studies show that institutional flexibility 
through the right to use and access forests is crucial when designing national and sub-
national REDD+ institutions (Larson, 2011; Vatn & Vedeld, 2013). Additionally, local 
communities’ clearly defined ownership of local forests is one of the most important 
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variables for the success of a CF (Pagdee et al., 2006). Based on the present institutional 
design of CFUGs and CAMCs, it can be inferred that any future forestry governance 
similar to CFUG’s framework would have a better chance of being accepted than the 
present CAMC’s institutional framework.  
The traditions of the Thakali community have variously affected the local political 
ecology of Mustang in terms of forest management, business and politics (see Bista, 
1971; Manzardo, 1977; Chhetri, 1986). Although migration is high in Mustang (see table 
2 of Paper IV), the traditional institutions nevertheless possess a large degree of 
influence over the formally implemented CF model (Paper III & IV). These traditional 
institutions, their practices and local dominance seem to be non-discursive elements at 
present, which can be challenging or even can be an anti-REDD+ discourse when 
devising REDD+ as a forestry governance (Paper II). The entanglement of traditional 
institutions in local forest management can therefore be challenging when customizing 
or implementing a new framework of forestry governance (see also Howell, 2014; 
Wallbott, 2014). 
The above reasons for the local variation in the acceptance of the CF models are 
arguably in line with Ruiz-Mallén et al. (2015), who explore two main factors that 
encourage users in local forest management and conservation, that is, institutional 
‘drivers’ and ‘motivations’. ‘Drivers’ include the extent of property rights devolved to 
communities, management policies, financial mechanisms and new market 
opportunities such as payment for ecosystem services. ‘Motivation’ includes the 
development of a collective sense of autonomy to gain access to natural resources and 
the encouragement of local people to participate in institutionalized management. The 
‘drivers’ factor relates to the Dolakha case, where CFUGs and users enjoy wider 
autonomy in the management and use of income, which resulted in the REDD+ pilot 
project not being resisted. The ‘motivations’ factor, on the other hand, primarily 
concerns the Mustang case, where, in addition to the strong persistence of traditional 
institutions, users have less autonomy compared to the CFUGs, which resulted in the 
local CF being resisted. 
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Ruiz-Mallén et al., however, think that migration facilitates conservation of local forests 
because users extract less resources from them. I argue that decreasing use and users of 
forests reduce the participation and leadership in local forest management, which may 
limit the extent of effect of ‘motivations’ factor on communities. Previous studies also 
show that the active involvement of communities is essential for the successful 
progression of REDD+ (Lederer, 2011; Chhatre et al., 2012; Visseren-Hamakers, 
McDermott, et al., 2012). 
Based on the above discussions, it can be inferred not only that acceptance of emerging 
systems of forestry governance is affected by the freedom to use and manage local 
forests and the existence of traditional practices, but also that high levels of migration 
can increase institutional vulnerability by preventing users’ participation and active 
leadership. Subsequently, it can affect the local ecology of forests. 
4.5 A critical reflection on CPR theory 
Theories of commonly held resources focus on the sustainable management of common 
resources such as forests, water, fishery and pastureland by a community's self-designed 
institutions (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001). The study of community 
forestry is therefore a study of a common resource. This study has criticized Common-
Pool Resource (CPR) theory in Paper IV. Here, I shall discuss how CPR can be modified 
and strengthened. The above discussions have the potential to contribute to the 
discussion on the management of common resources and can be used for the 
enhancement of CPR theory in general.  
There are two well-known theories regarding the management of common resources: 
Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ and Ostrom’s ‘CPR theory’. Hardin (1968) claims 
that if the commons are open to all, it brings ruin to all, meaning that the openness 
destroys the resources and thereby causes a ‘tragedy of the commons’. An individual or 
rational user, according to Hardin (1968), always tries to augment his/her private benefit 
when using the commons. Being open to all denotes freedom to all, which can lead to 
the problem of users seeking to free-ride. Hardin (1968) conceptualizes the commons as 
an ungoverned, open-access resource from which nobody can be excluded. Unregulated 
use of the commons therefore creates environmental problems which affect all users, 
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and which therefore lead to a tragedy. To avoid such a tragedy, Hardin suggests the 
nationalization or privatization of common resources. Hardin did not recognize that 
commonly used resources could also be managed by the users themselves if they share 
common interests.  
Criticizing Hardin's model of managing the commons, Ostrom (1990) argues that both 
privatized and nationalized institutions are external mechanisms which can affect the 
individuals who use the common resources on a regular basis. According to Ostrom 
(1990: 88-102), the common resources or Common-Pool Resources (CPRs) can be 
sustainably managed without the interference of the state if they are managed through 
the users' own self-organized institutions with some sort of rules concerning 
implementation, management and monitoring of CPRs. The individuals who self-
organize mostly earn their economic returns from the CPRs and are thus motivated to 
solve common problems to enhance their own productivity over time. Ostrom (1990: 
25) challenges the presumption that individuals cannot organize themselves and always 
need to be organized by external authorities. This CPR model of Ostrom has been 
adopted by many developing nations, and in some cases has also succeeded in 
preventing the problem of free-riding to some extent (Cox et al., 2010; Saunders, 2014; 
Chaudhary et al., 2015). 
In 1957, prior to Hardin's theory, Nepal’s government nationalized the forests with the 
objective of halting deforestation and environmental degradation. Despite these good 
intentions, the government was not able to regulate the national forest effectively due to 
insufficient human and technical resources (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; Bhattarai et al., 
2002). The nationalization also undermined traditional systems of management (Paudel 
et al., 2009). Consequently, farmers regarded the government-owned forest as if it 
belonged to nobody, and so it therefore became a de facto open access resource. As a 
result, nationwide deforestation occurred between 1957 – 1977 (Bajracharya, 1983; 
Hobley, 1985; Arnold & Campbell, 1986; Messerschmidt, 1986; Ostrom, 1990: 23; 
Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). The government realized that without decentralizing some 
degree of management rights to local communities, the deforestation could not be halted. 
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The 1957 change in forestry regime proves that Hardin's way of managing the commons 
is not appropriate to regulate common resources sustainably. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, prior to the advent of Ostrom's CPR theory, Nepal’s 
government started to relinquish some of its forest management powers to the local 
communities. This shift in forestry regime achieved national momentum during the 
1990s and has subsequently succeeded in halting deforestation, conserving biodiversity, 
supporting rural people’s livelihoods and establishing local-level institutions (Gilmour 
& Fisher, 1991; Rusten & Gold, 1995; Jackson et al., 1998; Acharya, 2002; Gautam et 
al., 2002; Manandhar-Gurung, 2007; Ojha, Persha, et al., 2009). Nepal's success in 
managing the commons by deploying local communities is renowned internationally. 
The 1957 nationalization also confirms that centrally controlled forest management does 
not fulfil the subsistence requirements of people whose livelihoods are related to forest 
resources. Although the government still holds property rights over forest land, the 
community forestry institutions of Nepal have been granted sufficient rights to design 
and implement rules for the betterment of local forests and users (see Paper IV). Nepal's 
successful history of community-based forest management proves that Ostrom's CPR 
theory is more appropriate than Hardin's approach to managing the commons. 
However, Ostrom's CPR theory is insufficient to accommodate emerging changes in 
forestry governance, such as REDD+. The theory does not address circumstances such 
as the duality of local forest management (as seen in Mustang); the decreasing use of 
the commons; and the power differences between the users. Ostrom's theory is modelled 
on eight principles that characterize self-organized CPRs, which are known as design 
principles.32 A “design principle”, according to Ostrom, is ‘an essential element or 
condition that helps to account for the success of [these] institutions in sustaining the 
CPRs and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the 
rules in use’ (Ostrom, 1990: 90). The findings of this study contribute to the discussion 
of  two of these principles, namely principle no. 2 on congruence between appropriation 
                                              
32 Ostrom's design principles are listed in Appendix 7  
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and provision rules and local conditions and principle no. 7, which maintains minimal 
recognition of rights to organize (Ostrom, 1990: 90). 
Principle no. 2 implies that appropriation and provision rules regarding the use of CPRs 
should be established in order to maintain the local people’s requirements. Congruence 
between these appropriation and provision rules also implies a level of congruence 
between the cost incurred by users and the benefits that they receive by participating in 
a CPR institution (Cox et al., 2010). I understand 'local conditions' as local traditions 
and villagers' usage habits, and 'appropriation and provision rules' as the measures 
designed to control, regulate and facilitate the appropriators’ or users' traditions and 
habits. 
Principle no. 7 implies that the appropriators’ or users’ rights to self-organize should not 
be challenged by external intervention, for example by local and central authorities.  
I argue that principle no. 2 is at risk when an external factor like REDD+ is implemented 
in local forests. For instance, in Dolakha, the users' tradition of using forests has been 
hampered by the implementation of the REDD+ pilot project, as it has banned grazing 
and limited users’ access to the forests. These rules were not imposed due to the scarcity 
of resources, decreasing carrying capacity of local forests, deforestation or any natural 
catastrophe; rather, they were implemented on account of the notion that forest users’ 
traditional usage habits can reduce the forests’ ability to sequester more CO2. In 
addition, a new forestry framework like REDD+ is beyond the users' traditional 
knowledge and technical ability to implement, regulate and sanction. These inabilities, 
after all, erode the users' traditional ability to self-organize in order to regulate the 
common resources. For the sustainability of forest institutions, such changes should be 
included in Ostrom’s CPR theory. 
Furthermore, Ostrom's theory does not account for situations in which two institutions 
- traditional and formal - co-exist and manage the forests together. If the Mustang case 
is analyzed from the perspective of the traditional institutions, the involvement of formal 
institutions can be considered to be an external intervention, which violates principle 
no. 7. If, on the other hand, it is analyzed from the perspective of the formal institution, 
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the persistence of traditional institutions and users' habits can be understood as the 'local 
conditions'. Since the formal institution manages the forest by merging several village 
forests, which the villagers consider to be an encroachment of their traditional practices, 
this violates principle no. 2. The inclusion of a provision within the CPR theory to 
address such a ‘dual management’ situation is therefore very important. 
Moreover, Ostrom's CPR theory is principally based upon the understanding that a 
community or local users are 'dependent' on CPRs, and that they therefore organize 
themselves in order to manage it. This study has shown that users' dependency on the 
forests for their livelihoods has decreased (Paper IV). The decreasing use of common 
resources has subsequently reduced users' willingness to participate in the local forestry 
institutions. In such changing contexts, Ostrom's CPR theory should give scope for the 
inclusion of internal (e.g., decreasing use and decreasing interest to self-organize) and 
external (e.g., REDD+) factors.  
Although the modification of the principles no. 2 & 7 in the “design principles” may 
strengthen the CPR theory, there is also the possibility of the re-centralization of forest 
management when implementing REDD+ (see Phelps et al., 2010; Vijge et al., 2016). 
In this sense, Hardin’s suggestion of the nationalization or privatization of common 
resources may gain prominence in the future when the carbon trade starts functioning 
nationally or globally. The design of institutions for common resources in the future 
should therefore not only consider the forest as a source of earning subsistence, but local 
communities should also be trained or motivated to seek other potential benefits from 
forest management. 
I argue that users’ dependency on the forest and their interest in self-organizing will 
both continue to decrease, unless migrants resume their village livelihoods. This, in turn, 
may lead to the continuing decrease of the forest’s value in supporting subsistence 
livelihoods, and to its increasing value for conservation purposes (i.e., protecting 
biodiversity, storing CO2). However, as a nation trying to achieve both economic 
progress and having about 45 percent of its total land covered by forests, Nepal should 
benefit from forests prioritizing development. In order to achieve this, CPR users should 
be trained to use forest resources for market purposes, for example managing forests to 
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produce timber, 33 CO2, herbs, cash crops, fruits, animal products etc. with a direct focus 
on market demand. In addition, the government should revise the existing rules in order 
to devise processes that more readily link CPR institutions to the markets. This will also 
encourage users to participate in local forest management, meaning that the chance of 
meeting both development and conservation goals may also increase. As a result, CPR 
institutions would have multiple opportunities for selecting the most appropriate option 
available to them, for instance using forests either for livelihood earning, or for 
participating in REDD+ or for selling forest products directly to the markets, or indeed 
a combination of the above. Molding CPR institutions into more commercially-minded 
local institutions is important for three main reasons. First, it motivates existing users to 
continue to protect the forests because they internalize it on account of their economic 
interests and can see it as a means of making their own economic progress. Second, the 
potential for attracting migrants to resume their living in the villages may also increase. 
Finally, benefitting from forests will contribute to Nepal’s overall economic progress.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The precursor to Nepal’s current community forestry (CF) is rooted in the apocalyptic 
conception of environmental degradation that was popular during the 1970s. Later on, 
the idea of CF was modelled to achieve the twin objectives of development and 
conservation. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) is a newly articulated framework with the same twin objectives. The objective 
of conservation is now extended to a global scale with regards to reducing global 
warming. Nepal also adopts REDD+ as a medium to alleviate poverty and conserve 
biodiversity. Subsequently, several REDD+ pilot projects have been launched through 
CF. Considering these changing contexts and realizing the extended responsibility of 
CF, this study has tried to examine the interactions of CF both with emerging forestry 
governance such as REDD+, and with traditional institutions. In order to accomplish 
this, the study has selected two types of CF institutions: the Community Forestry Users 
                                              
33 One study found that the timber alone from CF can generate income of approximately NRs 




Groups of Dolakha District and the Conservation Area Management Committee of 
Mustang District. 
Two key conclusions, which have become salient during the analysis, are drawn here. 
Firstly, the success of any new forestry governance depends upon the degree to which 
it facilitates the communities’ access to the forest. The conservation of carbon is not the 
primary concern of subsistence farmers. In the case of Dolakha, the communities' access 
to the forests has been restricted as a result of the implementation of the REDD+ pilot 
project. Any emerging forestry governance should therefore not neglect the local 
communities' customary usages. 
Secondly, although there are not many traditional forestry institutions left in Nepal, the 
traditional institutions of Mustang have been found to be effective in the management 
of local forests. An appropriate space for traditional practices should therefore be 
allocated when designing new forms of forestry governance. The success or failure of a 
forestry institution can be determined by how flexibly its rules are executed, and whether 
or not it can gain the support of local people and their institutions. In order to be accepted 
by local communities, emerging forestry governance should therefore provide sufficient 
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Appendix 2: Total population by caste-ethnicity, Dolakha & Mustang, 2011 
Dolakha Mustang 
Caste/ethnicity Total % Caste/ethnicity Total % 
Chhetri 62319 33.4 Gurung 2879 21.4 
Tamang 31286 16.8 Thakali 2533 18.8 
Newar 17488 9.4 Lhopa 2507 18.6 
Brahman-hill 17136 9.2 Magar 1112 8.3 
Thami 16622 8.9 Kami 1069 7.9 
Sherpa 8924 4.8 Chhetree 941 7.0 
Kami 7976 4.3 Damai/Dholi 532 4.0 
Jirel 4493 2.4 Brahman-Hill 462 3.4 
Damai/Dholi 4109 2.2 Tamang 287 2.1 
Sarki 4014 2.2 Newar 106 0.8 
Magar 3048 1.6 Sherpa 96 0.7 
Gharti/Bhujel 2684 1.4 Rai 76 0.6 
Sunuwar 1829 1.0 Chhantyal/Chhantel 76 0.6 
Sanyasi/Dashnami 1330 0.7 Sarki 70 0.5 
Gurung 970 0.5 Thakuri 62 0.5 
Majhi 410 0.2 Dalit Others 53 0.4 
Terai Other 303 0.2 Bhote 51 0.4 
Thakuri 272 0.1 Tharu 42 0.3 
Rai 117 0.1 Thakuri 39 0.3 
Badi 115 0.1 Badi 21 0.2 
Undefined Others 42 0.0 Kulung 12 0.1 
Tharu 38 0.0 Limbu 12 0.1 
Kathbaniyan 36 0.0 Other 414 3.1 
Brahman-Tarai 35 0.0 All caste 13452 100.0 
Hajam/Thakur 32 0.0    
Musalman 30 0.0    
Ghale 28 0.0    
Koiri/Kushwaha 17 0.0    
Haluwai 17 0.0    
Yadav 12 0.0    
Dhanuk 11 0.0    
Teli 11 0.0    
Others 803 0.4    
All caste 186557 100.0    
Source: National Population and Housing Census 2011, Village Development 
Committee/Municipality (2014); Dolakha and Mustang (Volume 06, NPHC2011) Central 





Appendix 3: Villages/hamlets (tols) visited in Dolakha, 2013 
SN 
Village/hamlet 




  Lakuridada Magapauwa 
1 Bhandare 5 0 5 
2 Bhiramuni 6 0 6 
3 Chhinke 1 0 1 
4 Chhipee 3 0 3 
5 Chisopani 1 6 7 
6 Choulaya 4 0 4 
7 Choutara 2 0 2 
8 DadaGaun 5 3 8 
9 DangiTol Surke 1 0 1 
10 Fulbari 3 0 3 
11 FulbariGhumti 5 0 5 
12 Hile 0 9 9 
13 JhakriChour 5 0 5 
14 Jhigane 2 0 2 
15 Karki Tol 0 2 2 
16 KhariDhunga 6 0 6 
17 KhariDhunga Rol 1 0 1 
18 Kundaldada 1 0 1 
19 LamcheAahal 0 5 5 
20 Okharbot 2 0 2 
21 Okhre 2 0 2 
22 Purano Gaun 0 3 3 
23 Rol 11 0 11 
24 Surke 16 0 16 
25 Swanra 5 0 5 
26 Syansi 3 0 3 
27 ThuloChour 3 0 3 












Total % Female Male 
Dolakha 
(2013) 
Newar 36 17 53 43.8 
Kshetri 11 14 25 20.7 
Tamang 22 9 31 25.6 
Thami 2 2 4 3.3 
Brahman 1 0 1 0.8 
Sherpa 0 1 1 0.8 
BK 4 0 4 3.3 
Nepali 2 0 2 1.7 
 Total 78 43 121 100.0 
% 64.5 35.5 100.0  
Mustang 
(2014) 
Thakali 20 26 46 74.2 
Sherpa 0 1 1 1.6 
BK 0 6 6 9.7 
Pariyar 0 2 2 3.2 
Gurung 1 5 6 9.7 
Lama 0 1 1 1.6 
 Total 21 41 62 100.0 
% 33.9 66.1 100.0  
Both 
districts 
Newar 36 17 53 29.0 
Thakali 20 26 46 25.1 
Kshetri 11 14 25 13.7 
Tamang 22 9 31 16.9 
Thami 2 2 4 2.2 
Brahman 1 0 1 0.5 
Sherpa 0 2 2 1.1 
BK 4 6 10 5.5 
Nepali 2 0 2 1.1 
Pariyar 0 2 2 1.1 
Gurung 1 5 6 3.3 
Lama 0 1 1 0.5 
 Grand total 99 84 183 100.0 









Total % Female Male 
Dolakha Newar 21 14 35 53.8 
Kshetri 3 2 5 7.7 
Tamang 10 8 18 27.7 
Thami 3 2 5 7.7 
Lama 0 2 2 3.1 
 Total 37 28 65 100.0 
Mustang Thakali 21 31 52 80.0 
BK 0 5 5 7.7 
Pariyar 1 3 4 6.2 
Gurung 1 3 4 6.2 
 Total 23 42 65 100.0 
Both 
districts 
Newar 21 14 35 26.9 
Thakali 21 31 52 40.0 
Kshetri 3 2 5 3.8 
Tamang 10 8 18 13.8 
Thami 3 2 5 3.8 
BK 0 5 5 3.8 
Pariyar 1 3 4 3.1 
Gurung 1 3 4 3.1 
Lama 0 2 2 1.5 
 Grand total 60 70 130 100.0 







Appendix 6: Total population of the Study VDCs by caste/ethnicity, 2011 
Dolakha 
       
Lakuridada 
Caste/ethnicity Population %  
Magapauwa 
Caste/ethnicity Population % 
Newar 1408 37.9  Newar 825 28.0 
Tamag 1224 33.0  Chhetri 833 28.2 
Chhetri 591 15.9  Tamang 732 24.8 
Thami 313 8.4  Brahman-Hill 313 10.6 
Brahman-Hill 84 2.3  Gharti/Bhujel 95 3.2 
Gharti/Bhujel 69 1.9  Kami 94 3.2 
Sherpa 13 0.4  Damai/Dholi 33 1.1 
Other 11 0.3  Sanyasi/Dashnami 20 0.7 
Total 3713 100.0  Other 5 0.2 
    Total 2950 100.0 
 
Mustang       
       
Jomsom 
Caste/ethnicity Population %  
Marpha 
Caste/ethnicity Population % 
Thakali 403 29.4  Thakali 544 35.1 
Grurung 244 17.8  Kami 223 14.4 
Magar 167 12.2  Damai/Dholi 151 9.7 
Kami 146 10.7  Gurung 148 9.5 
Brahman-Hill 94 6.9  Magar 122 7.9 
Tamang 88 6.4  Other 76 4.9 
Chhetri 56 4.1  Brahman-Hill 74 4.8 
Damai/Dholi 44 3.2  Chhetri 68 4.4 
Newar 29 2.1  Tamang 51 3.3 
Serpa 24 1.8  Tharu 22 1.4 
Badi 21 1.5  Rai 21 1.4 
Sarki 15 1.1  Newar 20 1.3 
Thakuri 14 1.0  Sarki 17 1.1 
Other 13 0.9  Sherpa 14 0.9 
Rai 12 0.9  Total 1551 100.0 
Total 1370 100.0     
 
Source: National Population and Housing Census 2011, Village Development 
Committee/Municipality (2014); Dolakha and Mustang (Volume 06, NPHC2011) Central 






Appendix 7: Ostrom's design principles  
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resources units from 
the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, material, and/or money. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in 
modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, 
are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the 
offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or by both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas 
to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators or 
between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged 
by external governmental authorities. 
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
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